Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Master's Theses

Graduate School

2010

"You can never convert the free sons of the soil into vassals":
Judah P. Benjamin and the threat of union, 1852-1861
Geoffrey David Cunningham
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses
Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
Cunningham, Geoffrey David, ""You can never convert the free sons of the soil into vassals": Judah P.
Benjamin and the threat of union, 1852-1861" (2010). LSU Master's Theses. 121.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/121

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

“YOU CAN NEVER CONVERT THE FREE SONS OF THE SOIL INTO VASSALS”;
JUDAH P. BENJAMIN AND THE THREAT OF UNION, 1852-1861

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
The Department of History

By
Geoffrey David Cunningham
B.A., The Evergreen State College, 2007
August 2010

For Tom

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to take a moment to thank a few people who have aided and encouraged my
pursuit of higher education. My parents, David and Patricia Cunningham, have been unyielding
in their support. My brother, Aaron Cunningham, has been a well of much needed levity at
several times throughout the past two years.
I owe an incredible debt of gratitude to my undergraduate mentor at The Evergreen State
College, Thomas B. Rainey, for believing in me and encouraging my pursuit of graduate school.
I have enormously benefitted from our many afternoon discussions over tea on the veranda. I am
continually inspired and humbled by his example.
The Department of History at Louisiana State University is an ideal environment for
prospective scholars. I wish to thank Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg for their
commitment to my improvement throughout the first year of graduate work. My major
professor, William J. Cooper, Jr., has been extremely generous with both his time and
knowledge. This thesis is immeasurably better thanks to his many suggestions. Charles Royster
also provided careful criticisms and I have learned a great deal from our biweekly
perambulations between Himes and Lockett Hall. Gaines M. Foster has also been generous with
his counsel and I am exceedingly fortunate to have profited from his thoughtful insights.
My fellow LSU graduate students Terry Wagner and Andrew Wegmann are the best
colleagues and friends one could ever be fortunate enough to know. I also would also like to
thank Shauna Ingwell, Kate Seyfried, Spencer McBride, Alan Forrester, Kristie Wallace, Katie
Eskridge, Adam Pratt, and Chris Childers for their support, and to the Chimes “family” that
provides a home away from home on Tuesday evenings.

iii

Most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, Jaina, for her love, and for agreeing to
live our first years as a married couple two thousand miles apart in order to support my dream. I
love her more than she will ever know.
Although my project has received assistance from the aforementioned, I accept full
responsibility for what lies herein.

iv

ABSTRACT
As one of the premier legal minds in the Senate, having twice declined presidential
nominations to the Supreme Court, Judah Benjamin‟s rhetoric contains the South‟s most
sophisticated and clear-minded legal expositions on constitutional theory, state sovereignty, and
republican government since the writings of John C. Calhoun. A well-known moderate,
Benjamin‟s national political career also reveals the effect of extremism on his own political
thinking, while offering a limited perspective into the shifting attitude of the Deep South as well.
Benjamin‟s judicious speeches counseled northerners that southern views of liberty and
sovereignty were inexplicably linked to slavery. With measured rhetoric Benjamin argued that
any attempt to regulate slavery not only imperiled southern liberty, but corrupted the original
spirit of the Constitution. Beginning in 1856, as a result of the Republican Party‟s emergence in
national politics, Benjamin increasingly employed strident rhetoric in his speeches which
embraced the political logic of secession. With Abraham Lincoln‟s election in 1860, Benjamin
not only defended secession‟s logic, but encouraged its urgent execution.
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INTRODUCTION
“I PART AS MEN PART FROM BROTHERS”
On a midwinter Wednesday, less than two months after the election of Abraham Lincoln,
John Slidell interrupted the ordinary business of the Senate and asked permission to “occupy its
attention for a very short time.” Slidell handed the secretary a note, which was read aloud. The
official ordinance from Louisiana‟s state convention announced that on January 25 its members
had concluded that “the union now subsisting between Louisiana and other States, under the
name of the „United States of America,‟ is hereby dissolved.” After the secretary finished,
Slidell resumed speaking, underscoring the principle of the recent dispatch from his home state,
“Louisiana has ceased to be a component part of these once United States,” he declared, which
constitutes a rupture that, “terminates the connection of my colleague and myself with this
body.” The tide of southern secession that had swept west across the Deep South during the
winter of 186o-61 now included Louisiana, and on this day beginning in early February,
Louisiana‟s senators bid farewell.
As the senior senator from Louisiana, John Slidell had the honor of speaking first. Slidell
discussed the uncertain future that awaited the newly independent Deep South states of South
Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and now, Louisiana. He spitefully remarked
that this new southern confederacy would not make any attempt to “improve the Constitution,”
but, “shall take it such as it is; such as has been found sufficient for our security and happiness,
so long as its true intent and spirit lived in the hearts of a majority of the people of the free
States.” In regard to the reaction of the federal government, Slidell spoke with an unrefined
bellicosity, for he had never possessed the oratorical gifts of Benjamin, and despite
acknowledging Louisiana‟s precarious position along the Gulf Coast, warned: “We have no idea
that you will attempt to invade our soil with your armies; but we acknowledge your superiority
1

on the sea...until we shall have acquired better ports for our marine.” Continuing in this vein of
bravado, the transplanted native son of New York threatened the federal government against any
attempts at coercion: “You may ignore the principles of our immortal Declaration of
Independence; you may attempt to reduce us to subjection, or you may…blockade our ports.” If
so, Slidell promised, “this will be war, and we shall meet it.”
The clear attitude of his state thus announced, Slidell issued a final belligerent pledge that
if the federal government attempted to force Louisiana back into the Union: “Every sea will
swarm with our volunteer militia of the ocean, with the striped bunting floating over their heads,
for we do not mean to give up that flag without a bloody struggle, it is ours as much as yours;
and although for a time more stars may shine on your banner, our children, if not we, will rally
under a constellation more numerous and more resplendent than yours.”1 Closing in a rather
astringent fashion, Slidell declined to issue any parting pleasantries to his former colleagues.
Instead, disregarding the decorum of the body to which he had just severed his relationship he
turned to his fellow Louisianan, Judah Philip Benjamin, and gave him the floor.
Despite the solemnity of the occasion, Benjamin managed to retain his often-noted softspoken manner of speech, perhaps believing the pistol that hung at his side to be evidence
enough of the graveness at hand.2 Benjamin opened his parting remarks by responding to those
who criticized Louisiana‟s secession, claiming that Louisiana had not been party to the original
compact. While Benjamin acknowledged that fact, he asserted that all states possessed an equal
right to the protections and extensions of liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, regardless of the
order of admission. Not allowing the irony of Louisiana‟s detractors to escape mention,
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Benjamin drew attention to the fact that northern politicians who denied Louisiana‟s right to
secede had justified their argument by claiming “the right of selling for a price that which for a
price was bought.” Northern claims about the illegality of secession, he maintained, effectively
treated all of Louisiana‟s citizens as subjects whose sovereignty had been purchased by the
federal government, thereby abrogating Louisianan‟s personal liberties. Benjamin pressed
forward on this matter, refuting such a line of thinking that held that the federal government
possessed sovereignty and not the people. “Although the domain, the public lands, and other
property of France in the ceded province” were purchased by the federal government in 1803,
Benjamin emphatically asserted, “sovereignty was not conveyed otherwise in the trust.”
Sovereignty was an inherent right of each state. Benjamin declared that it had never been the
founders‟ intention to cede sovereignty to the federal government; additionally sovereignty could
never be purchased by the federal government. As such, the act of secession by Louisiana was a
legitimate and lawful response to secure the sovereignty of the state from an adulterated federal
compact. Any attempt to deny secession, Benjamin claimed, implied that the federal compact
exercised a near despotic control over sovereignty, which, he argued, subjugated a state‟s
citizens and made them inferior subjects of the federal government.
The legal argument adopted by Benjamin was certainly influenced by John C. Calhoun‟s
writings on constitutional theory. Using the broader sweep of Calhoun‟s thoughts, Benjamin
posited that any federal claim on a state‟s sovereignty was a blatant usurpation of the federal
compact, which by its very assertion defined the corruption of the federal system that the South
now protested. “Of all the causes which justify the action of the southern States, I know none of
greater gravity and more alarming magnitude than that now developed of the denial of the right
of secession,” he proclaimed. Secession, if instigated to preserve sovereignty and individual
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liberty, Benjamin asserted, was a legitimate action beyond reproach, akin to the inherent right of
revolution embraced by all constitutional governments since the English Revolution. He further
insisted that throughout the nation‟s history no one had ever attempted to avow “a pretension so
monstrous as that which perverts a restricted agency...and denies all legitimate escape from such
despotism…and converts the whole constitutional fabric into the secure abode of lawless
tyranny.” A flawed interpretation of the Constitution that denied a legitimate right of secession,
Benjamin thus argued: “degrades sovereign States into provincial dependencies.” He disputed
the concentration of federal power, claiming that such a consolidation of power had never been
the intention of the founders. Benjamin closed his defense of secession‟s legality by attempting
to lay claim to the notion that the secession of the Deep South preserved the federal compact‟s
original intent of a sovereignty that ultimately rested with the people.
As Benjamin defended Louisiana‟s constitutional right to divorce itself from the national
Union, he linked the principal motivation of southern independence to the American Revolution.
“We are told that the laws must be enforced,” Benjamin began, recapitulating the prosecutorial
meme of secession‟s critics, “that the South is in rebellion without cause, and that her citizens are
traitors.” Resenting the charge of treason, he offered a sharp retort; “Ay, sir, the people of the
South imitate and glory in just such treason as glowed in the soul of Hampden; just such treason
as leaped in living flame form the impassioned lips of Henry; just such treason as encircles with
a sacred halo the undying name of Washington!” Benjamin argued that the principle of
disrupting government did not owe to some petulantly concocted southern claim, but rather that
it had been based on an assertion of a natural, indisputable right that underlay every
constitutional government since the Glorious Revolution in 1688. Benjamin grounded this
argument in a historical context, claiming that the right traced back to John Hampden in the
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English Revolution, which he linked to the American Revolution‟s definition of freedom and
liberty championed by Patrick Henry and embraced by George Washington. Moving from the
past to present, Benjamin implied that the South‟s actions were determined to defend this timehonored principal of constitutional government.
Having exhausted his arguments, Benjamin concluded by turning to his colleagues of the
past eight years: “And now to you, Mr. President, and to my brother Senators, on all sides of this
Chamber, I bid a respectful farewell.” In stark contrast to Slidell, Benjamin issued courteous
parting pleasantries to his colleagues. Despite the chasm now between them, Benjamin
remarked that his work in the Senate chamber affirmed “a respect and esteem that I shall not
willingly forget.” Addressing his fellow southerners, many of whom faced an uncertain future
within the Union, Benjamin, belying his belief that common interests would unite them again
soon, closed: “I part as men part from brothers on the eve of a temporary absence, with a cordial
pressure of the hand and a smiling assurance of the speedy renewal of sweet intercourse around
the family hearth.” And to those such as his intimate colleague James A. Bayard of Delaware,
Benjamin conveyed a most melancholy sentiment, “But to you, noble and generous
friends…who have made our cause your cause, and from many of whom I feel I part forever,
what shall I, can I say?”3
"The Senate was hushed in stillness," wrote Senator Thomas Bragg of North Carolina,
adding: “Every word in his soft but distinct utterance fell clearly upon the ears of his hearers."
Bragg observed that both Slidell and Benjamin shed tears, and commented that when he took
their hands to bid farewell, he was "too full to say a word."4 Another spectator, E.D. Keyes, an
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adjutant to General Winfield Scott, recalled in later years: “I heard the farewell speeches of
Senators Jefferson Davis of Mississippi and Benjamin of Louisiana....Mr. Benjamin appeared to
me essentially different.” Beyond the stark differences in the physical appearance between the
two men, Keyes discussed Benjamin‟s ability to deliver a speech without offense: “When I
listened to his last speech in the Senate…such verbal harmony I had never heard before! There
was neither violence in his action nor anger in his tone, but a pathos that lulled my senses like an
opiate that fills the mind with delightful illusions.”5 Not all in attendance offered Benjamin such
effusive praise.
Fellow southerner and future president, Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, did not share
Keyes‟s or Bragg‟s sentiments. The Baltimore Sun reported on the leave of Slidell and Benjamin
by writing, “Mr. Johnson alluded sneeringly to the withdrawal of the Louisiana senators as a
scene well gotten up and enacted.” Entirely dismissive of Slidell, Johnson insulted Benjamin
with the pejorative that as he heard Benjamin speak, he mistakenly “thought Marc Antony had
returned.”6 In private, Johnson‟s ferociousness focused on Benjamin‟s Jewish ethnicity, and he
implied that Benjamin‟s disloyalty owed to his Hebrew faith: in sum, that had no sense of honor
that he was not willing to sell.7 Born in the West Indies and of Sephardic Jewish ancestry,
Benjamin had been the first self-proclaimed Jew to be sworn in as a senator. Although one of
Benjamin‟s close friends and fellow southerners, the Floridian David Yulee, later termed the
“Florida Fire-eater,” technically earned the distinction, Yulee had renounced Judaism upon
marriage. Benjamin declined to follow in the course of Yulee, and he resisted converting to
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Catholicism when he wed the French Creole Natalie St. Martin.8 With the withdrawal of
Louisiana‟s senators from the Union on February 5th, the Senate had lost its Jewish senator.
Although Benjamin‟s distinctiveness provides an alluring entree into his political and
personal life, much remains impenetrable. In his lifelong desire to avoid becoming the subject of
a biographical study, Benjamin burned all of his papers and private correspondence. When the
journalist Francis Lawley visited Benjamin in England late in his life to inquire about the
prospects of writing a biographical work, Benjamin responded: “I have no materials available for
the purpose. I have never kept a diary, or retained a copy of a letter written to me.” The reason
for this practice, Benjamin implied, owed to his concerns about his Jewish ancestry, “I have read
so many American biographies which reflected only the passions and prejudices of their writers,
that I do not want to leave behind me letters and documents to be used in such a work about
myself.”9 Despite Benjamin‟s lifelong efforts to avoid historical assessment, his involvement in
the nation‟s most significant historical event, coupled with an ironic sense of mystery that built
up as a result of his private nature, contributed to an abiding interest in his life and work.
The first biography of Benjamin appeared in 1907, just over twenty years after his death
in 1884. Written by Tulane University English Professor Pierce Butler, Judah P. Benjamin
offered an idiosyncratic turn-of-the-century study of Benjamin‟s life. Butler benefited from a
proximity to several of Benjamin‟s ancestors, and his oral interviews resulted in the
accumulation of a limited number of primary materials from Benjamin‟s heirs. The second
book-length study of Benjamin came thirty-six years later. Written by history Professor Robert
Douthat Meade, Judah Benjamin: Confederate Statesman reflected the period‟s growing interest
8
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in the Civil War and devoted extended attention to Benjamin‟s actions while attorney general
and secretary of war and state in the Confederate government. The most recent biography of
Benjamin was published in 1988 by Richmond, Virginia, lawyer Eli N. Evans. Evans‟s Judah P.
Benjamin: The Jewish Confederate was inspired by Evans‟s own southern Jewish identity.
Evans explains, "Part of my fascination…comes from my own life as a Jewish Southerner. At
times, I provide my own insights …because I cannot help feel that even though our boyhoods
were separated by more than a hundred years, Benjamin is not remote. He is somehow familiar
because there are certain changeless verities to growing up Jewish in the Bible Belt and passing
for white in that mysterious underland of America."10 As Evans‟s preface attests, his approach
depends upon speculations about Benjamin‟s personal thoughts and a timeless similarity between
the period of his own life and that of Benjamin. As a whole, the current biographies of Benjamin
focus on his ethnic and religious identity, or his association with the Confederate government.
None offer a detailed study of his political career throughout the political turmoil of the 1850s.
Fascination with Benjamin has not been the purview of historians alone. In 1927, twenty
years after Butler‟s biography, Stephen Vincent Benet wrote the epic poem, John Brown’s Body,
and discussed, in lyrical grandeur, the mysteriousness of Benjamin: “‟I am a Jew/ What am I
doing here?.../A river runs between these men and me,/A river of blood and time and liquid
gold/…And we speak to each other/Across the roar of that river, but no more.” Benet also
somberly expressed the significance of Benjamin‟s Jewish ancestry: “I hide myself behind a
smiling fan./They hide themselves behind a Gentile mask/And, if they fall, they will be lifted
up,/Being the people, but if I once fall/I fall forever, like the rejected stone.” Benet‟s tragic verse
poignantly suggests the extent to which Benjamin feared becoming a pariah, the South‟s Judas.
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Although the events of Benjamin‟s life have attracted the interest of three biographers
and poets, his notable nine year senate career has received only limited attention. Yet
Benjamin‟s time in the Senate, from 1853 to1861, coincided with several of the gravest political
years in the nation‟s history. His speeches on the rights of the South came at the same time that
the collapse of the Whig party forced him to redefine his own political convictions, resulting in
an unusually introspective elocution of constitutional thought and personal liberty. Throughout
the growing ideological split between the North and South, Benjamin frequently forewarned of
the danger of partisanship, yet also participated in advancing a parochial, southern definition of
republicanism. In one of his first major addresses to the senate, Benjamin addressed the
territorial issue and advanced a strongly southern position, while also attempting to find accord
over the disruption in the Whig Party. As political compromise over slavery became an ever
more remote possibility, and political rhetoric grew more extreme, Benjamin warned of the
consequences, yet employed it at several junctures of his career. The progression of hostility that
Benjamin experienced, and helped to foster, is best reflected in the rhetoric of his speeches; their
close study reveals the gradual forces of extremism on his own political thinking and on the
thinking of much of the South.
Throughout Benjamin‟s early senate career the diversity of Louisiana‟s population and
economy helped to temper extremism, and after his conversion to the Democratic Party he
enjoyed the protection of John Slidell‟s superior political machinery. Slidell‟s control of the
party not only prevented the emergence of Fire-eaters, but allowed Benjamin a great deal of
personal latitude in national politics.11 As a result, Benjamin‟s positions and speeches are some
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of the least extreme and least hyperbolic perspectives into the South‟s changing attitude toward
the Union, and reveal the process by which the compact of Union came to be viewed by
Benjamin, and the South, as a threat to southern liberty and a corruption of the Constitution. As
one of the premier legal minds in the Senate, having twice declined presidential nominations to
the Supreme Court, Benjamin‟s Senate speeches also contain some of the South‟s most
sophisticated and clear-minded legal expositions on constitutional theory, state sovereignty, and
republican government since John C. Calhoun. 12

12
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CHAPTER ONE
“THERE IS NOT A BREEZE THAT BLOWS THAT DOES NOT SOUND THE TOCSIN OF
ALARM”
Benjamin‟s circuitous path to the Senate began when, as a young man, his family left the
Virgin Islands and settled in Charleston, South Carolina. Although Jewish, foreign born, and
from an undistinguished family, Benjamin followed in the path of southern scions and attended
Yale. He performed well until a peculiar setback, one which has yet to be fully revealed by
scholars.13 After exiting Yale under suspicion, Benjamin briefly returned to Charleston where
his family had settled, but found living with his parent‟s unhappy marriage unbearable. To
remedy his situation Benjamin looked to the newly developing lands of the Southwest. Perhaps
he merely sought to escape, or perhaps he thought relocation his best opportunity to overcome
what must have been the greatest disappointment of his young life. Whatever his reasons,
Benjamin left his family and placed his future hopes in the South‟s largest city.
New Orleans was on the verge of a great transformation in the late 1820s. The newly
opened lands of the southwestern frontier proved both inviting and prosperous, and the city‟s
port at the bend in the river served as the terminus for much of the agricultural products grown
along the vast reaches of the Mississippi‟s riparian soils. Overseas trade brought immigrants
from Europe who sought work along the city‟s immense half-moon shaped wharf, which became
piled high with hogsheads of sugar and bales of cotton. The decade of the 1830s transformed
New Orleans from a European outpost to the American South‟s most populous and cosmopolitan
entrepôt with a unique mélange of white and black southerners, immigrant German and Irish,

13
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French Creoles, and Free People of Color.14 The city‟s slave trade, conducted along the avenues
off Chartres and Esplanade and in the lobby of the St. Charles Hotel became the largest in the
nation as a great forced migration relocated over half a million slaves from the exhausted upper
South to the muddy virgin soils of the southwest. Beginning in 1820, 155,000 slaves were
driven overland in coffles or debarked on ships bound for Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
The decade of the twenties merely presaged the future waves of slave migrations to the Deep
South. During the 1830s an unsurpassed 288,000 slaves were relocated to the new southwest,
and after a slight dip to 189,000 during the decade following, given the economic recession of
1837 compulsory slave resettlements once more reached the quarter-million mark in the decade
before the Civil War.15
Aside from its economic prospects, New Orleans also had a cultural and religious
diversity that in 1828 included a small Jewish community of nearly seven hundred.16
Benjamin‟s survey of the Crescent City in the late 1820s would thus have looked quite promising
and well suited to a young man with talent and ambition. Upon his decision to settle in New
Orleans Benjamin immediately began to study law. From the time of his arrival in 1828 he
worked long hours as a legal clerk and studied for the state‟s bar exam before passing it in
1832.17 Benjamin‟s study of Louisiana‟s laws impressed upon him the need for a comprehensive
digest of the state‟s complex and overlapping legal codes. After passing the bar he quickly
devoted himself to compiling such a work. Benjamin relied on his linguistic acuities to decipher
the state‟s multilingual assemblage of United States, French, and Spanish legal codes. To aid in
14
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the formidable task of assembling a digest of legal summaries he turned to a fellow lawyer and
friend, Tom Slidell, who happened to be the brother of powerful Louisiana politico John Slidell.
Together, Benjamin and Tom Slidell wrote summaries of more than 6,000 legal cases, and by
1834 the two completed their exhaustive work. The Digest of the Reported Decisions of the
Superior Court of the Late Territory of Orleans and the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana
became a professional and economic success. The Digest was soon chosen as the standard
source for judges and lawyers throughout the state. The Digest helped advance both Benjamin‟s
and Slidell‟s careers, and inaugurated a thirty year partnership between the Benjamin and Slidell
families. In 1842 Benjamin again turned to Tom Slidell to partner in a high profile international
legal case. Working together, the partnership proved successful once more. Unlike Tom Slidell,
who pursued advancement in the legal profession, Benjamin parlayed his most recent acclaim to
gain entry into state politics.18 Once in politics, Benjamin‟s relationship with the Slidell family
became much more closely involved with Tom‟s brother, John.
In addition to his success as a lawyer, Benjamin became an enterprising planter in the
mid 1840s when he acquired the sugar plantation “Bellechasse,” which was located just
downriver from New Orleans.19 In the midst of his legal successes and plantation acquisition,
Benjamin won nomination as a Whig to the lower house of the Louisiana legislature in 1844.
During that year‟s presidential campaign, Benjamin eagerly stumped throughout Louisiana for
the Kentuckian Henry Clay. Benjamin proved an enthusiastic advocate and capable
18
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communicator of the benefits of the Whig Party‟s economic platform, with its intent to use the
auspices of government to improve infrastructure, advance education, and create general
prosperity. Moreover, the greatest political issue for Louisiana‟s sugar planters during the
campaign was the restoration of the tariff on sugar, which had been steadily reduced by
Democrats throughout the 1830s and 1840s. If elected, Clay promised to restore the duty which
would boost production within the state and lead to expanded profits for Louisiana‟s “sugar
masters.”20 The strength of the Whig bloc of sugar planters posed a serious threat to Democrat
James K. Polk. To combat the local Whigs, Louisiana Democrats turned to the cunning John
Slidell, an original son of New York, to bring upcountry machine politics down country to
Louisiana. Slidell did not disappoint, for he leased steamboats to transport questionably
registered voters into Plaquemine Parish where a lack of credentials failed to pose a serious
impediment to voting. Slidell‟s chicanery put the Democrats over the top and resulted in Polk
carrying Louisiana, which completed his sweep of the Deep South. Despite the Whigs‟
disappointing loss, however, Benjamin‟s efforts on behalf of Clay were rewarded with a
successful election to the state‟s constitutional reform convention that began in 1844. 21
Louisiana‟s original 1812 Constitution had embraced strict voting standards, severe
banking regulations, and stringent office-holding provisions, all of which were intended to
reserve the offices of government for the state‟s elite planters and businessmen. In 1844
Louisiana Democrats, who overwhelmingly represented rural areas of the state, successfully
mounted a reform campaign by claiming that the constitutional requirements accorded a

20
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disproportionate share of power to the state‟s urban Whig delegations.22 As a Whig Benjamin
opposed the Democratic Party‟s proposed reforms and remained steadfast in his commitment to
the original constitution.23 At the outset of the convention Benjamin was certainly not the most
prominent Louisiana Whig, especially given his junior political standing, but over the course of
the debates he earned the respect of his fellow party members through his rhetorical skills and
gradually assumed a leadership role in rebutting Democratic charges. With persuasiveness and
eloquence, Benjamin defended the state‟s constitutional requirements by arguing that the debates
over constitutional reform pertained to the highest of democratic principles. His arguments
throughout the 1844-45 convention provide an important opportunity to examine Benjamin‟s
nascent political convictions. The debates also provide limited insight into his largely obscured
personal convictions.
Benjamin‟s first remarks in the convention came on January 23 when he rose in defense
of property qualifications for legislators. Benjamin argued the conservative line that such
credentials were necessary to ensure that candidates could be trusted to defend southern liberties,
and he immediately displayed a talent that would emerge in later debates where he expanded the
argument beyond immediate considerations to incorporate overriding principles. Benjamin
explained: “This State is peculiarly situated, and her position exacted some measures of prudent
forethought, in order to shield her from assaults upon a vulnerable point. Her peculiar
institutions were liable to attack, and it was to preclude the danger which menaced her that some
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measure, similar to the one under discussion, was deemed of vital importance.” His allusion to
the threats to slavery in 1845 must have registered as initially surprising for the peculiar
institution seemed relatively secure on the national political level given that the last two
presidential candidates both supported slavery. Yet, Benjamin‟s statement revealed another
important facet of his political astuteness. In addition to his sharp inductive logic, which quickly
transformed debates and shifted the ground beneath his opponents, Benjamin‟s speeches also
reveal his perceptive talent to anticipate political developments with uncanny accuracy and
position himself accordingly.
Benjamin‟s propensity to consider the future contours of political debates over slavery
helps to explain, in part, his repudiation of the Democratic Party for its position that the state
constitution embodied anti-republican tenets. In Benjamin‟s response to Pierre Soule, who
claimed that qualifications for legislators were antithetical to democratic governance, Benjamin
initially retorted by broadening the debate: “The member from Point Coupee, had stigmatized the
proposition as anti-republican….If the principles be anti-republican, then Madison, Franklin, and
Washington, were anti-republican, since they sanctioned it.” Benjamin applied the legacy of the
national founders to dismiss objections to Louisiana‟s suffrage provisions, which demonstrated
his quick wit and propensity to turn the debate back around on his opponents. Importantly, it
also provided insight into his deeper concerns about the political future of slavery.
Benjamin‟s invocation of the revolutionary generation revealed an anxiety about the
broader significance that might be implicated by any changes to Louisiana‟s state constitution.
“There is one subject…that I approach with great reluctance,” he prefaced, suggesting the sweep
of his forthcoming statement, “It is a subject of vital importance to the southern States, and
should produce at least unanimity in our councils, to avert a common danger.” Benjamin
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appealed to the concerns of all southerners, not just Louisianans, and used the occasion of the
state‟s constitutional convention to share his view that local politics were largely inseparable
from national affairs. Protecting Louisiana‟s republicanism, Benjamin argued, required local and
regional unity. To this extent he claimed that Louisiana‟s constitution constituted an integral
part of interlinking state and federal constitutional framework that, through an implicit historical
precedence, sanctioned southerner‟s peculiar institution.
Attempting to impart his perspective to his colleagues, Benjamin forwarded a plea for
regional unity: “It is not the part of wisdom, however we may differ, to wrangle where the safety
of all may be compromitted.” He argued that the preservation of Louisiana‟s original
constitution constituted the best means of preventing future political threats to slavery, and he
offered a prospective scenario that would likely soon face the South. “A question may arise in a
few months that will obliterate all party distinctions; when there will be neither whigs nor
democrats. When the whole South will coalesce and form a single party, and that party will be
for the protection of our hearths, of our families, and our homes.”24 Benjamin looked to
Louisiana‟s western border, and anticipated that the central question over Texas‟s annexation
would revolve around slavery and its expansion. In later years the southern diarist Mary
Chestnut observed Benjamin‟s prescience first hand and dubbed him the South‟s “Delphic
oracle,” writing that the accuracy of his assessments always led to considerable reflection. 25
Benjamin‟s discussion over Texas proved just such an example, and he pleaded that any changes
to Louisiana‟s suffrage and office holding restriction might weaken Louisiana‟s political unity,
thus compromising its capability to defend slavery just at the time when southern unity would
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prove of paramount importance. In the following year the events surrounding Texas‟ annexation
grew rancorous, just as Benjamin had feared; although Louisiana‟s southern political unity
remained intact.
Benjamin believed so strongly that ambiguous future dangers threatened slavery and
imperiled Louisiana and the South that he recapitulated many of his arguments throughout the
1845 convention. To guard against these indistinct future assaults, Benjamin openly addressed
the pointed hostility he believed directed at the South. “That man must be indeed blind not to
perceive from when the danger comes. The signs are pregnant with evil. The speck upon the
horizon that at first was not bigger than a man‟s hand, overshadows us, and there is not a breeze
that blows that does not sound the tocsin of alarm.” Surely such a time was inappropriate to
continue political wrangling over constitutional revisions, he argued, perhaps out of conviction
and political calculation, or likely, both. Continuing in an apprehensive vein, Benjamin
employed the single greatest political fear of southern slaveholders, envelopment: “The light is
shut out, and we should prepare ourselves to meet the emergency, whenever it may come.” If the
South failed to win statehood for Texas, the future would be cut off from southern slaveholders
at the Louisiana border, a result which Benjamin feared would lead to the economic and political
suffocation of the southern states.
Throughout the constitutional convention Benjamin continually relied upon the power of
his political rhetoric to express concerns about the factionalizing potential wrought by changing
voting requirements and office holding provisions. Benjamin believed that the dangers facing
slavery far outweighed the problems with the state‟s original constitution, for threats to slavery
would require southerners to rally to its defense in a solid bloc of political unity. His conduct
evinced a political boldness reminiscent of the Calhounian proposition of reshaping political
18

identity to reflect common regional interests, but, despite his propensity to forward such an
audacious political idea, Benjamin never issued anything resembling a southern call to arms.
Yet, for a southern Whig to advocate the ideological position of such a distrusted
Democrat was unique and notable. Only with a unified South Benjamin had argued, using the
rough contours of Calhoun‟s own propositions, could the region‟s combined political strength
force northern acceptance of the southern interpretation of the federal compact. Benjamin
believed Louisiana‟s original constitution provided the best defense of slavery because it
embodied, in his estimation, the natural law of the superiority of the white race. Any legal
instrument based on such an inconvertible truth, according to his mind, reinforced the soundness
of southern states‟ constitutions. Benjamin stated that the South‟s “organic law would be
deficient if it did not guard us from the machinations of an insidious foe. The course of events
must rely upon ourselves and our southern confederates, to maintain our rights and cause them to
be respected, and not upon the stipulations in the federal compact.”
By the midpoint of the convention in early 1845, Benjamin had thus anticipated the
national political rancor that would break out within the year. He had advanced by the halfway
point in his deliberations the best course of action for Louisiana, in his opinion, which involved
the preservation of strict constitutional provisions precisely because of their explicit protections
of the South‟s most important institution. To alter Louisiana‟s state constitution in any capacity,
Benjamin argued, was to leave a flank of the united South vulnerable to assault. It would
compromise the region‟s ability to invoke an unbroken state and federal constitutional sanction
of slavery through the unforeseen introduction of a volatile and unpredictable expanse of the
franchise in Louisiana.
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On February 14, one of the leading Democratic members of the convention, Pierre Soulé,
asserted that restrictions for the office of governor were harmful and undemocratic. The slight
on constitutional restrictions elicited a pointed reaction from the junior Whig from New Orleans:
“Sir,” Benjamin exclaimed, directly addressing Mr. Soulé: “Scarcely a provision of any kind can
be proposed in this hall without an outcry about „restriction‟ upon the people.” Seizing upon
what he believed a dangerous proposition, Benjamin rhetorically asked why the members were
present: “Is it not to make a constitution?” Answering his own question with another, he
proffered: “And what is a constitution except a system of rules and restrictions intended to secure
a permanent government, which shall be unaffected by the changing views and passions of the
hour; which shall restrict majorities and protect minorities?”26 Benjamin‟s emphasis of
restrictions is noteworthy, and he believed it required such stressing that he underlining the word
in his prepared remarks. He intimated through his elliptical reference to the maintenance of
southern rights that the future passions of the hour might well be directed at the South‟s
economic institution.
The importance of restrictions in southern politics was a key element to Calhoun‟s
deliberations on the nature of the relationship between a state and the federal government and
every member at the convention would have understood Benjamin‟s line of argument.
Calhoun‟s articulation of a concurrent majority, a phrase yet to be defined in 1845, with its
proposed right to restrict the “irresponsible power” of a majority when its actions were
“inconsistent with liberty” was similar to the larger governing principle of restriction that
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Benjamin now energetically defended.27 The constitution‟s restrictions, he had previously
asserted, vitally protected liberty through its sanction of slavery. To remove the qualifications
for governor, Benjamin stated, allowed the state‟s highest office to be dangerously prone to
popular passions, which, once elected, might not hold any regard for the liberty and property of a
minority. New Orleans, with its ever expanding stream of immigrants, gave Benjamin pause.
Introducing the unpredictable element of newly arrived immigrant‟s political convictions into the
southern polity, at a time when southern unity was most needed, Benjamin believed dangerous.
To allow this new political body the possibility of electing the state‟s highest elected official, he
asserted, was unwise to the extreme.
Benjamin believed franchise restrictions were of such importance that he touched on the
subject once more when he addressed the convention on March 12. He sternly objected to a
proposition to allow a popular majority to pass constitutional amendments, and forcefully argued
that such a low standard for reform would subject the liberty of the minority to popular whims:
“It is not questioned that in all republican governments majorities must rule,” Benjamin
affirmed, lest anyone believe he sanctioned an “aristocratic” framework for governing, as had
been leveled at the state‟s current constitution. “But,” Benjamin said, “It is no less true that the
constitutions of all the States are made for the purpose of protecting the rights of the minority
from being trampled upon by the majority.” Speaking on the importance of limiting the scope of
government, Benjamin stated: “The only reliance the minority can have, is the measure of
restriction thrown into the Constitution by which they are to be governed.” A constitution that
failed to reconcile majority rule with the protection of a minority, Benjamin declared, resulted in
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the “instrument” of government becoming “useless.” At the heart of his deliberations can be
detected the broader arguments for defending the South and its peculiar institution against
whatever future onslaughts Benjamin believed might be directed at slavery. If Louisiana did not
stand for the rights of the minority in its own framework of government, he seemed to intimate,
how could it claim any protection from an overbearing national government?
To demonstrate the misguided nature of the majority proposal, Benjamin read from
Democratic president James K. Polk‟s recent inaugural address: „By the theory of our
government majorities rule but this right is not an arbitrary or limited one. It is a right to be
exercised in subordination to the constitution, and in conformity to it.‟ Benjamin‟s recapitulation
of a Democratic president‟s political values undercut the popular amending provision, and he
employed Polks‟s own words to prove his earlier point that such casual amending of the
constitution endangered the South through disregard for “one of the fundamental principles of
our system of government: that constitutions are made for the protection of minorities.” If such a
provision passed, Benjamin threatened that constitutional “protection is null and void.”
The removal of restrictions on the majority in a constitutional framework so worried
Benjamin that he claimed: “It would be better to have no constitution at all, than to rely upon any
thing so illusory for protection against the sudden changes of popular feeling.” Demanding
reverence for the chief instrument of government as it originally had been drafted, Benjamin
declared: “A constitution is not a piece of patch-work, for people to tinker on….The object of the
constitution is to protect all equally, not to give one portion a right to impose on another portion
of citizens, and that cannot be called a restriction, which is intended to the protection of the
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rights of the whole equally.”28 This antecedent was a sentiment that Benjamin would hold
throughout his entire political career. His arguments against lessening restrictions were not the
musings of a calculating politico solely seeking advantage or leverage. The constitutional issues
of governing, introduced at the nascency of Benjamin‟s political career, occupied a central place
throughout his political life. Benjamin‟s thoughts on the subject overwhelmed all of his other
political concerns, and he repeatedly discussed and refined his opinions on this matter through
future speeches and letters.
Benjamin‟s performance in the 1844-45 convention impressed his colleagues and marked
his emergence as a leader among Louisiana Whigs. As an experienced and highly successful
lawyer, he had ably argued the merits of preserving Louisiana‟s original Constitution to defend
the rights of the minority and retain the conservative checks on government. The convention
also demonstrated that separating southern liberty from slavery proved impossible for Benjamin,
for he had stood by his defense of the constitution‟s original restrictions out of a belief that they
provided the best means of preserving republicanism as it uniquely applied to southerners.
Although he had won many of the arguments on principle, in time even Benjamin would find
certain conservative provisions of the original constitution too restrictive for a growing
Louisiana.
By 1852, conditions in Louisiana and throughout the South had changed considerably.
Louisiana no longer resembled the state that he had encountered twenty years earlier, and the
1845 Constitution inhibited Louisiana‟s economic and political growth. Both Democrats and
Whigs shared a common dissatisfaction with the apparatus that appeared increasingly antiquated
to their contemporary economic affairs and political considerations. The two parties agreed to
28
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hold a new convention, and demonstrating just how drastically the landscape had altered in the
past seven years, Benjamin and his Whigs accepted a changed franchise requirement, which he
had so ardently fought for in 1845, in exchange for fewer regulations on banks and corporations.
When the principle of total representation, making slaves equal to white men in terms of voting,
was offered for consideration Benjamin acquiesced since it did not represent, in his estimation, a
threat to slavery for it consolidated the power of white planters. It certainly represented a
conservative retrenchment by all accounts.
Benjamin‟s support for the 1852 convention‟s other reforms, like lessened regulations on
banks, owed to his political identification with the Whig party, which sought to utilize the power
of government to aid in overall infrastructure and economic development. Benjamin had also
become involved in a railroad interest in New Orleans that he hoped would help the state expand
economically by pushing west to California.29 Historian Michael Holt writes of the second
constitutional convention in Louisiana: “To achieve what Whig delegates wanted on banking and
other economic provisions in the new constitution, they made a Faustian bargain with Democrats
to change the basis of representation in the legislature in ways that reduced the influence of
Whiggish New Orleans and increased the representation of Democratic cotton planters.”
Benjamin, never a strict political partisan, certainly met the criteria that Holt has provided. “This
was the act of men,” Holt argues, “who having secured certain specific goals through the partisan
political process, were preparing to abandon it.”30 Benjamin‟s support for the 1852 reforms
hinted at such a move. Although his private thoughts remain concealed, it is conceivable that in
Benjamin‟s opinion the new apportionment would begin to lead southerners down the long path
toward southern political unity. If that elusive goal remained his focus, for it had been
29
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something he had advocated since his emergence in politics eight years previously, abandoning
an overtly partisan process would certainly be a necessary first step.
Benjamin‟s defense of Louisiana‟s conservative constitutional provisions, and his belief
in the necessity of political unity, had echoed the concerns of the South‟s most formidable
defender of southern rights, the late John C. Calhoun. Calhoun‟s distrust of northerners to respect
the southern interpretation of the federal compact eventually led him to advocate direct
confrontation with northerners to win recognition. Historian William J. Cooper writes: “As
Calhoun envisioned that declaration, it would come from the Congress and would abide by his
and the South‟s theory of the sanction and protection given to slavery by the Constitution.”31
Through the political maneuverings of the 1852 convention Benjamin evinced a belief in the
strength of Calhoun‟s approach, and he hinted at a willingness to abandon a strictly partisan
Whig identity in the belief that only the clout of regional unity could win conciliation over
slavery from the North. Benjamin‟s aim, despite sharing a common conviction with Calhoun,
differed in approach. It importantly departed from Calhoun‟s failed confrontational approach
and instead pursued southern recognition through conciliatory, as opposed to provocative,
means.
Benjamin‟s emergence throughout both conventions as a skilled leader with bold
initiatives won him the state‟s newly open national Senate seat. The Daily Delta newspaper of
New Orleans initially scoffed at the idea of Benjamin serving as the state‟s national senator, and
wrote: “His appearance in that body would startle the gossips at Washington. His boyish figure
and girlish face, - his gentle, innocent, ingenuous expression and manner, his sweet and
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beautifully modulated voice, would render him decidedly the most unsenatorial figure in that
body of grey beards and full grown men.”32 The Delta’s comments spoke to Benjamin‟s Jewish
physiognomy, and its editors believed that his cherubic appearance, black locks of tousled curly
hair and manicured beard were too conspicuously Jewish, too much of a potential affront to the
respectability of Washington society.
But Benjamin defied his critics and upset more established Louisiana politicians thanks to
his performance in the state‟s conventions, and to his unique ability to draw supporters from his
identity as both a rural sugar planter and urbane city lawyer.33 Upon reporting his election, the
Delta was forced to offer a modicum of congratulatory remarks: “Though not yet forty, he has
reached the topmost round of the ladder of distinction as an advocate and counselor in this state.”
As a senator, his “fine imagination…exquisite taste, great power of discrimination, a keen, subtle
logic, excellent memory” and “admirable talent of analysis” would render him a fair addition to
that body of seasoned white haired sages.34 Benjamin heard the news of his success from Latin
America, where he was arguing a legal case, and was sworn in on March 4, 1853, the same day
as the incoming fourteenth president of the United States, Franklin Pierce.
Benjamin spent much of his first year in the Senate observing debates and serving on the
two committees to which he was assigned. But in May of 1854, just two months shy of his first
anniversary as a senator, he found himself and his Whig party thrust into a debate that gravely
threatened the party‟s political survival. Ever since the resounding defeat of Winfield Scott, the
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Whig presidential candidate in 1852, the Whig party struggled to fight off national collapse.
Scott‟s defeat created for Benjamin an unpalatable nativism within the party, which he
vehemently opposed. Having first developed in the Northeast, the anti-immigrant, anti-Catholic
platform found particularly fertile soil in immigrant rich New Orleans.
As the prospects for a national Whig resurgence appeared dim, Stephen A. Douglas of
Illinois introduced a profound piece of legislation which radically shifted the ground beneath
both the Democratic Party‟s and the Whig Party‟s foundations. In late 1854 Douglas, harboring
presidential aspirations, introduced his Kansas-Nebraska Bill. Despite Douglas‟s confidence in
the ability of his legislation to resolve the issue of slavery‟s westward expansion, the KansasNebraska Bill immediately unraveled the interregional and interparty cordiality that had been
hard won by Clay and Douglas in the Compromise of 1850. Sensing political weakness in their
emaciated regional Whig adversaries, southern Democrats coordinated a strong response to the
Whigs‟s initial strike which called for an explicit repeal of the Compromise line of 1820.
Southern Whigs like Benjamin attempted to parry the responding thrust of Democrats by
affirming their support for the expansion of slavery in bold terms, despite the qualms expressed
by their northern counterparts. Southern Whigs‟ bold statements of support for the Nebraska bill
attempted to challenge the Democrat‟s unity for southern Whigs knew that if they faltered in
convincing southern voters that the Whig Party remained an enthusiastic champion of slavery,
they faced total political ruin at home.35
At the same that southern Democrats and Whigs pushed each other further along the
spectrum of support for slavery‟s expansion, northern politicians in both parties expressed
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reservations about Douglas‟s bill. The debate over Kansas-Nebraska quickly defied any
politician or party to control the tenor or direction of deliberations. In the devolving atmosphere
of partisan rancor, Benjamin could see the polarizing effect of the bill on both parties‟ regional
loyalties, and he equivocated. After witnessing the divisions introduced by the successive
southern amendments that sought explicit repeal of the compromise line of 1820, Benjamin
announced his intention to vote against any further amendments to end the destructive debate.
Before Benjamin conveyed these sentiments to his colleagues, however, Senator Benjamin Wade
of Ohio, the leader of the free soil wing of the Whig party, delivered an impassioned protest that
indicted southern Whigs and demonstrated that the Nebraska bill had already introduced an
irrevocable division within the Whig party.
Decrying a selective meeting of southern Whigs who had assembled to coordinate votes
in the Senate, Wade declared that the clandestine southern caucus proved the nefarious existence
of the slave power. “The fate of this great territory is to be fixed without consultation with the
North,” he thundered, and displaying a personal affront, condemned the fact that “no northern
statesman is thought of sufficient consequence to take into counsel.” Wade oscillated between
expressing his wounded pride and issuing impudent assertions, and observed that between
northern and southern Whigs: “All is silent as the grave.” Wade accused southern Whigs of
meeting to coordinate “a declaration of war on the institutions of the North.” The South, he
spoke of broadly, “put the North at defense, and declared a sectional war for the mastery.” Wade
then definitively declared: “I accept the issue thus tendered,” which rendered the future
cohabitation of free- and slave-soil impossible. He concluded by issuing a final ultimatum to the
nation‟s political system: “Slavery must now become general, or it must cease to be at all.”

28

Having declared cooperation with southern regionalists impossible moving forward,
Wade directed his most acidic comments at those whom he felt betrayed the Whig party for the
benefit of the slave power. “Let it always be understood,” he began, “that this sectional strife
was commenced by the South alone – ay, by southern Whigs.” Wade hinted that he might have
expected a secretive caucus to further southern slave rights from Democrats, but to hear of such
developments within his own party, he felt, was tantamount to betrayal. With a dramatic
flourish, after issuing the ultimate disputation over slavery‟s future in the United States, he
concluded: “We cannot have any further political connection with the Whigs of the South; they
have rendered such connection impossible. An impassable gulf separates us, and must hereafter
separate us.”36 The loss of northern fidelity to the Whig Party, which had begun after 1852, had
arrived at its disastrous end.
With his party collapsing around him Benjamin faced the overwhelming task of
delivering his first significant remarks to the Senate. Attempting to tailor his speech to win back
northern Whigs, while simultaneously defending the actions of himself and his fellow southern
Whigs, Benjamin opened with an accustomed formulaic recitation of constitutional provisions.
He repeated many of the arguments he had previously made about the benefit of original
interpretation, and stated that Douglas‟s bill merited support because it: “Proposes to go back to
the tradition of the fathers. It proposes to announce, as a principle…that the General
Government is not to legislate at all upon this question of slavery.” Benjamin stated that as
Douglas presented the bill it restored the founding tradition which Benjamin believed erased the
dangerous and prohibited congressional regulation of slavery: “It is not to legislate to extend it; it
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is not to legislate to prohibit it; it is a forbidden subject.” There could be no contention over
slavery, Benjamin claimed, for it was a sanctioned and protected institution.
After explaining his reasons for supporting the Democratic bill, Benjamin addressed the
northern public: “Let the American people understand this subject in its true bearing; let the
North once be disabused of the false impression that the South desires any advantage over it, or
any unequal share of the privileges of the Government.” Echoing a familiar southern refrain, he
added: “Let out friends in the northern States once be convinced that all we ask and desire is the
simple privilege of being let alone.” To this explanation Benjamin added an unusual statement,
which deviated from all of his previous characteristic compositions, and directly addressed
slavery‟s deep historical roots and centrality to southern society:
Blest or cursed, as you please, with an institution which we find established among us
when we were born, and which will probably exist when we descend to our graves, an
institution which is so firmly knit among us that it cannot be torn out without tearing up
the very heart strings of society, is it wonderful, is it unreasonable, is it not most
reasonable, that we should ask gentlemen from other sections of the Confederacy simple
to let us alone?
Slavery, Benjamin avowed, defined southern society.
In an attempt to heal the division that had opened during the evening‟s deliberations,
Benjamin next appealed to his fellow Whigs: “I hope I shall not be considered as acting
improperly if I venture to appeal to my Whig brethren from the North, notwithstanding all that
has been said this day.” Benjamin addressed Wade, regardless of the fact that he had retired
from the chamber. “I would include in this appeal the senator from Ohio…for whom I feel a
sincere regard and respect, a regard and respect which have been elicited by his bearing in this
very debate. I admire that bearing,” he, offered: “Bold, manly, decided, and fearless of
consequences, he has stated his sentiments, and given utterance to them with that vigor of
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expression which belongs to a man actuated by perfect sincerity.”37 Benjamin‟s compliments
rang out so effusively that they revealed the sardonic tinge of his biting sarcasm. His scorn for
Wade‟s ostentatious display was made all the more apparent by the facetious jab at his “perfect
sincerity,” which intimated that Wade had perhaps protested too much and suggested that he was
trying to shield larger political motives behind an outlandish display of moral indignation.
Knowing that Wade‟s hostility to slavery made it unlikely he would to return to the Whig
Party, Benjamin made a larger entreaty to his party, and encouraged them to remain steadfast in
face of recent political adversity. Senator Wade “has spoken of the last bond being broken
which united together that Whig party to which I have been attached from my boyhood.”
Staking his own claim to the party‟s many triumphs and failures, Benjamin said, “I have stood by
it through good and through evil report, as he has done; I have shared with him its hours of
danger, of darkness, and distress; and I have no doubt that my voice has gone up with his in the
same exultant shout in the moments of victory.” If northern and southern Whigs had rallied
together through failures and triumphs more extreme than the current situation presented,
Benjamin asked, “Why, then, sir, has [Wade] given utterance to such feelings on a subject like
this[?]” Benjamin hinted that Wade‟s passions exceeded those normally caused by a personal
affront, and intimated that his behavior was driven by a desire to emerge as a leading politician
in a new northern free soil coalition.
Benjamin issued extended comments in regard to party fidelity, and claimed an equal
ownership of the banner of the Whig Party on behalf of his fellow southerners. “May I not say
that [Wade] has looked at the provisions of the bill with a jaundiced eye?” Pleading for a fresh
beginning to the deliberations, Benjamin insisted that if northern Whigs reviewed the bill‟s
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provisions without preconceived fears, they, like their southern colleagues, would see its virtues.
“It erases this geographical sectional line,” Benjamin decreed, “which [Senator Wade] says is
abhorrent to his own feelings; for he declares that he desires no geographical parties.” He then
made one final plea for northern Whigs to rally with southerners under a common banner:
“Cannot we still hold together, and cannot we banish this matter forever from the Halls of
Congress?”38 Benjamin had argued the merit of returning to the original interpretation of the
federal compact as he and the South understood it, which restricted Congress from interfering
with slavery. His plea for unity had come at a time when the northern wing of the Whig party
was disbanding to take up the free soil cause. Once Wade declared reconciliation between the
party‟s northern and southern wings impossible, the likelihood of northern free soil Whigs
returning to a party with southern slaveholders grew exceedingly remote. Historian Michael
Holt writes of the event: “Bitter accusations from northern Whigs about Southerners‟ betrayal of
the Whigs‟ national platform and of a sacred intersectional compact, and particularly their
statement that no Northerner could coexist with slaveholders in the territories, deeply affronted
southern Whigs‟ honor and convinced a number of them that they must deal no longer with their
northern Whig tormentors.”39 Even if the northern free soil Whigs had altered course and wished
to return to a unified party, their assaults on fellow southern Whigs made it doubtful that any
such overture would have been well received.
Benjamin emerged from this first debate with a markedly different perspective. He
foresaw the reemergence of slavery as a contentious issue, and after the party‟s regional dispute
erupted on the senate floor he predicted the inability of the southern Whigs to withstand the
disaffection of its northern wing. In public Benjamin continued to espouse hope that the
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northern and southern wings could overcome their present divisions, but in private he remained
much more skeptical. Writing to his friend and fellow Whig, A.H.H. Stuart of Virginia,
Benjamin said: “I am sorry, my dear Sir, that I cannot take quite so hopeful a view of the future
as you seem to anticipate.” Acknowledging Stuart‟s observations about the disarray of the
Democrats, Benjamin provided an equally bleak assessment for the future of the Whig Party:
“Every northern Whig in both branches voted against the Nebraska bill.” Even more troubling,
Benjamin wrote, were the fearsome developments he predicted for the upcoming presidential
election. “A gulf wide, deep, and I fear, impassable is already opened between the northern and
southern Whigs,” he began, before offering his opinion that a “grand coalition based exclusively
on what they call opposition to the slave power” would develop.
When this coalition emerged, Benjamin feared, “you will find that three-fourths of the
Northern Whigs will join it. If I be right in this prediction God knows what awaits us.”
Benjamin then ventured: “The future looks full of gloom to me.” Despite despair, he remained
hopeful for his longtime prospect of southern unity: “I see but one salvation for us. I say it to
you confidentially, but my honest conviction is that we shall be driven to forming one grand
Union party to be made up of the entire South acting unanimously and joining the National wing
of the Northern democracy.” Benjamin ended his letter to Stuart with a chilling thought; if
southerners failed to unite in their interests in forthcoming election cycle, he wrote, “The North
will carry out all the measures of the free-soil Whigs and democrats.” Apprehensively, he
pondered: “– and then what becomes of the Union?”40 He closed with the ominous question
which occupied the thoughts of everyone in Washington.
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On the 18th of July, 1854, almost one month after Benjamin recorded his downcast
thoughts to Stuart, Free Soil Senator Charles Sumner, the heir to Daniel Webster and a vehement
opponent of slavery, offered a congressional resolution to support the creation of a Pennsylvania
Abolition Society memorial. Sumner‟s legislation provoked southern opposition, as he knew it
likely would, and he relished the opportunity to force southern politicians to discredit the very
society once headed by America‟s senior-most Revolutionary forefather, Benjamin Franklin.
Benjamin rose to the challenge issued by Sumner, and demonstrated his keen intelligence on
matters of law and governance. Benjamin‟s performance ultimately left him with a considerable
impression about the extreme difficulties that faced the South in its attempt to pursue the
southern definition of the federal compact.
Before Benjamin could engage Sumner in debate, however, he first had to listen as the
senator from Massachusetts dismissed the objections of Whig Senator William Dawson of
Georgia and Democrat James Bayard of Delaware by stating: “My object is to simply set myself
right. That I can do.” Implying that defenders of slavery lacked moral ballast, Sumner added: “I
know, sir, that I can set myself right always.” Benjamin proceeded cautiously and opened the
exchange in his accustomed fashion, with an extended exposition on the seven articles of the
Constitution. “Now, sir,” Benjamin initiated, “the Senator on several occasions…has denied the
obligation, as I understand him, under the Constitution of the United States, to deliver up the
fugitive slaves from the free States to the owners in the slave States.” Benjamin had thus
announced the intention of his debate: he sought acknowledgment from Sumner about the
validity of the southern interpretation of the federal compact, with its clear sanction of slavery
firmly intact.
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In courting Sumner, Benjamin asked for clarity: “I will respectfully ask the Senator from
Massachusetts to inform me if that is what he asserts?” Declining to answer such a broad
question, Sumner responded with flattery: “The manner of the Senator from Louisiana is always
so kind and so much in conformity with the proprieties of debate that I shall have great pleasure
in answering his questions; I should prefer to wait until he gets through.” But Benjamin
displayed his talent for extemporaneous exchanges and insisted: “I simply wish to
inquire…whether he acknowledges any obligation imposed by the Constitution…for the return
of fugitive slaves? That is the only question which I desire to propound to him before I
proceed.”
Sumner responded to Benjamin‟s aims by advancing his own queries intent on forcing
Benjamin to support personal liberty laws and the North‟s own claim of the state‟s rights mantle:
“And before I answer that question, I desire to ask whether a free black citizen could be jailed
and sold into slavery for trivial fines.” Sumner‟s retort was answered by Benjamin curtly: “that
is entirely unconstitutional.” Sumner, who believed to have trapped Benjamin, pressed forward:
“I will then ask the Senator if he is ready in his place to introduce an act of Congress to carry out
that provision of the Constitution, to secure to the colored citizens of the North their rights in
South Carolina and Louisiana?” But Benjamin returned Sumner‟s line of questioning by
responding: “This is a very extraordinary method of answering a question. I have heard of the
Yankee method of answering one question by asking another; but this is answering one by
asking two.” Benjamin‟s quip was met with laughter, and he capitalized on the moment to press
Sumner for recognition of the South‟s claims, asking if northerners “recognize any constitutional
obligation…to provide for the return of a fugitive slave from the free to the slave States?” But
Sumner refused once more, and replied: “Before answering the question of the Senator,” he said,
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before again being interrupted by laughter; undeterred by the commotion, Sumner continued
talking around Benjamin.
With Sumner‟s elusive responses, Benjamin felt unable to continue the debate at this
point, and peremptorily exclaimed: “My object is answered, sir.” Senator Clement Clay of
Alabama seconded Benjamin‟s claim: “Exactly; do not say another word.” Displaying
dissatisfaction with the debate, not only personally but in regard to the general treatment of the
South for its pursuit of achieving recognition for its understanding of the federal compact,
Benjamin stated he felt “put upon the stand.” After Benjamin resumed his seat the yeas and nays
were called to table the resolution, Senator Butler of South Carolina caustically crowed: “„No.‟ I
want everything to come. Let the crisis come as soon as it can.”41
At various points in the debate Benjamin tried to side-step Sumner‟s acrimoniously
tinged questions aimed at impugning the moral judgment of the South for its defense of slavery.
Indeed, the purpose of Sumner‟s motion intended to impose a moral censure on the South, while
Benjamin idealistically tried to focus the debate on the political recognition of constitutional
obligations. He had persistently pursued acknowledgment of the South‟s interpretation of the
federal compact in face of obstinacy. Believing that the compact offered a clear sanction of
slavery, and furthermore, the explicit inability of Congress to regulate or interfere with its
operation, Benjamin emerged from this exchange as a capable defender of the South and its legal
reasoning. By rendering Sumner effectively mute on substance, he garnered the attention of his
colleagues and became quickly recognized as one of the South‟s most capable orators. Yet,
Benjamin had scored only a marginal political victory for the South, and he had clearly misread
the tenor of his debate with his free soil colleague. Indeed, Benjamin‟s debate with Sumner,
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during which the two men merely talked through each other, pointed to the seriousness of the
divide that stood between the free soil and pro-slavery ideologies.
Benjamin‟s debate with Sumner fortified his conviction that the emergence of the free
soil movement constituted a direct threat to the South and to the institution of slavery. Within
the coming year he would take action in the direction that he had long advocated in an attempt to
forestall the growth of the free soil movement and prevent its emergence as a national political
threat to the South and slavery. The disintegration of the Whig Party created such a significant
national political realignment that Benjamin‟s own foresight proved incapable of predicting its
immediate political impact, or lasting personal consequences.
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CHAPTER TWO
“THE STRUGGLE IS NARROWED DOWN TO A CONTEST BETWEEN THE
DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PARTIES”
Benjamin began the second session of the 33rd Congress just as he had finished the first,
engaged in a sharp debate over the rights of the South. He had entered the fray in a dispute over
provisions of the fugitive slave law in the hopes of winning more than another troubling silence
from the formidable Free Soil Party senator from Ohio, Salmon P. Chase. The debate occurred
under the listing, “Execution of United States Laws,” and grappled with the appropriate
protection for federal agents who carried out arrest warrants for suspected fugitive slaves in
northern states. Proposed by Connecticut senator Isaac Toucey, a Democrat, the bill sought to
remove jurisdiction for federal agents accused of wrongdoing from state to federal courts to
avoid the heavy prejudice they faced among the northern population.
The debate began Friday, February 23 with Chase responding to Toucey‟s motion by
expressing disdain for what he perceived as Congressional championing of southern causes:
“[T]he exclamation, „Nigger Bill!‟ proceeding from some Senator – I know not whom –
appraised us that the measure to be enacted on belonged to that class which has, by usage here,
precedence over all other legislation.” Chase, obviously of one mind with the anonymous
heckler, lamented the alleged priority given to proslavery bills. He expressed resentment at the
treatment of his own antislavery motions and claimed that his antislavery bills were
undeservedly yet purposefully neglected as a result of the slave power control over Congress: “I
asked only for a reference to a select committee….Was it granted? Did the Senate make haste to
show its respect for the great right of petition, and for the numerous and respectable citizens
whose wishes I made known?” Chase, showcasing his indignity, continued: “No, Sir…Not even
the respect of reference could be extended to them.” He followed up his theatrical protest by
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exclaiming that antislavery motions like his had been “thrust upon the table „to sleep the sleep
that knows no waking.‟”
Chase continued with his protest, asserting that: “This bill is framed in the interest of the
ruling class.” He leveled an accusation that his colleague‟s legislation acted as a front for
southerners intent on using federal powers to coerce northern complicity in slavery. “Its object is
to secure the stringent execution of the fugitive slave act,” he argued, so that the South may
circumvent “the recent State legislation to protect the personal liberty of the citizen endangered
though the operation.” Arriving at the end of his accusatory argument, Chase forwarded his
boldest claim: “Sir, this is a bill for the overthrow of State rights. It is a bill to establish a great
central, consolidated, Federal Government.” Exaggerating further, he exclaimed: “It is a step, let
me say a stride rather, toward despotism.” Chase then argued that the corruption of the
Constitution had been a natural consequence of the Fugitive Slave Law. The debasing
significance of that bill, in his estimation, owed to the fact that “when Congress usurped the
power to legislate for the reclamation of fugitive slaves… further legislation became necessary to
the complete humiliation of the States.”42 Chase argued that the tonic for the malady of the
corrupted Constitution could be found in northern state liberty laws. His ironic embrace of
states‟s rights, to avoid what he believed the denigration of the Constitution, delighted southern
politicians. The quick-witted junior senator from Louisiana immediately seized upon Chase‟s
awkward conclusion and pressed the South‟s cause forward.
Benjamin‟s reply revealed that he had clearly been surprised by the debate which
proceeded from Toucey‟s proposal, and his slashing retorts against Chase‟s assertions exhibited
an aggressiveness which had been previously latent. His response also hinted at the umbrage he
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carried from his earlier debate with Sumner. Any umbrage that he felt would have been merely
added to by the equally vituperative comments from Wade and William Fessenden of Maine,
which came on the heels of Chase‟s speech. Benjamin opened his response to Chase with a
broad riposte to the charges of southern aggression: “[T]he South have said over and over again,
that all they ask, all they ever asked, was to be let alone. All they desire…was that legislation in
the northern States should leave southern rights and southern property free from further
aggression.” He then attempted to hang the mantle of antagonist around the neck of northerners,
and argued that the legislative compromises which confined slavery geographically were
historical incidents of northern belligerence intended to shut the South out of the West by
confining its economy behind artificial borders.
Benjamin lingered over the crux of Chase‟s speech, mocking his and his fellow
northerners shift in principles as they sought refuge from constitutional laws in state sovereignty.
He specifically called out Michigan‟s, Connecticut‟s and Wisconsin‟s enactment of personal
liberty laws, arguing that each undermined the apprehension of fugitive slaves. Benjamin
interpreted these laws as purposefully undermining the Constitution, and delivered the most
damming indictment of northern actions yet heard from his lips: “We find that State after State,
throughout the North, is directing its legislation, and not only directing its legislation, but that its
courts of justice are perverting its jurisprudence in direct attacks upon the Constitution of the
country and the rights of the southern portion of the confederacy.” It marked the first time
Benjamin openly accused the North of corrupting the Constitution.
Since previous scholars of Benjamin‟s life have largely overlooked the details of his
political career in the Senate, instead preferring to focus on his later occupation or ethnic
identity, this changing attitude has been largely ingored. Both Benjamin‟s rhetorical and
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substantive protestations to Chase‟s assertions reveal a new, harsh tone and expose his shifting
conviction about national unity. His words also belie a transformation in his approach to
winning southern recognition of the federal compact; he no longer defended the southern
interpretation, but instead prosecuted an offensive political assault on northern politicians whom
he believed sought to use the instrument of governing to advance their own regional agenda.
Demonstrating this new directness, Benjamin incredulously stated: “Who would have ever
expected, a few years ago, to have heard it said…by Senators from the North, that State tribunals
were vested with jurisdiction…to determine upon the constitutionality of laws enacted by the
Congress of the United States.” Enjoying the spectacle of recounting recent northern actions to
validate long-held southern beliefs, Benjamin delivered a protracted examination that began with
his feigned interest in the new northern position that a State‟s “…decisions were of greater
weight, and entitled to high respect, than the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States; and that it required nothing more than an inflamed prejudice to pervert the course of
decisions in any one of our sister States.” His noted sarcastic wit was rarely displayed so well.
Moving from mockery to indictment, Benjamin shifted his tone and forwarded a bold
accusation, striking out along the path that he would pursue for the remainder of his Senate
career: “I am not going too far in stating that the whole course of northern legislation upon this
subject… has been a course of direct war upon the South.” Benjamin, who had earlier predicted
the situation that he now confronted, for the first time invoked the serious threat of a civil war
and turned to ancient history: “We beg in the language of the Trojan hero, that we may not be
„drawn into such contests,‟ for the most that we can do is to save ourselves harmless.”43 With
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regional antagonisms brazenly exchanged, he pointed to the travails of the ancient Greeks to
illustrate the perils and destructiveness of such internecine conflicts. Benjamin‟s invocation of
the The Illiad revealed his belief that a contest between the North and South would not be a
quick or easy affair, but instead would parallel the epic destruction that befell ancient Greece.
Benjamin once more attempted to recuse the South from any complicity in inaugurating
aggression. “All the triumphs that we can gain will result but in the simple right to remain just
where we were before the battle was fought. What interests have we then; what imaginable
motive can actuate Southern men to desire the agitation of the question?” Drawing careful
attention to the fact that the South could only wish to perpetuate what it presently practiced, he
refused to allow the South to be portrayed militantly, and insinuated that only the North had
motivation for such an aggressive contest since they would benefit from the subjugation of their
southern regionalists. Benjamin reinforced his claim about the northern incentive for violence by
unleashing a withering condemnation on the violent actions that accompanied the arrest of
several fugitive slaves in New England. He impugned the notion that southerners always sought
violent means to achieve their ends, and attempted to foist a reputation for aggression onto his
northern adversaries:
Now, when in the execution of a constitutional and admittedly binding law of the Federal
Congress, the officers of the United States…are set upon by mobs, their lives are not only
threatened but absolutely taken in open day; when the blood of the slaughtered victims
still smoke in the streets of Boston; when the officers of the United States…are
slaughtered in cold blood, the appeal is made that you shall remove such causes from
jurisdictions where they are prejudged, and where your officers are condemned before
being heard. And when we answer this appeal we are told it will be violating northern
prejudices, and inflaming northern passions: that we are the aggressors – that we are
always the aggressors.
known, for he also delivered a lecture to the Library Association of Petersburg, Virginia which he entitled, “The
Roman Lawyer, in the Age of Cicero.” Robert Douthat Meade, Judah P. Benjamin: Confederate Statesman (New
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In the face of such violent acts, which openly flaunted the Constitution, Benjamin asserted that
the North singularly benefited from acts of extra-legal hostility. The mob violence directed at
federal officers, and intended to obstruct the execution of federal laws, alarmed Benjamin. He
believed that the turn toward outright violence signified a nation at the precipice.
Benjamin expressed angst that northern violence in face of the South‟s constitutional
pursuit of fugitive slaves signified the unlikely and dismal prospects for reaching some sort of
lasting political compromise. In the most arresting comments of the entire speech, which are
notable given his previously terse and forthright declarations, Benjamin warned that the brazen
political indictments and acts of extra-legal aggression were often precursors to conflict: “We are
told that the North does not deprecate that contest; that the North is strong enough to crush us, to
put us down.” He turned from these bold opening lines to offer a sober assessment of southern
strength, one that appears to have been influenced by a judicious review of the 1850 census: “Sir,
the North is strong enough.”44 Benjamin undercut jingoistic southern beliefs about southern
male superiority by stating: “We feel” northern superiority, but even more importantly, “we
know it.” Expounding on the regional divisions of strength, he admitted “the North” had in fact
“been strong enough at all times to injure” the slaveholding South, which had fallen behind the
North in industrial might and population.
In light of this acknowledged disparity, Benjamin stated that arguments intended to
embarrass the South or imply its moral degeneracy “never have had any other effect
than…undermining our attachment to that noble structure of which we were once so proud to be
members.” As if to prove this point, Benjamin subtly shifted his rhetorical discourse on the
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Union. For the first time he spoke of the nobility of the Constitution in the past tense, as a thing
no longer extant, and he implied that southern pride in American nationhood had assumed
nostalgic dimensions. Where national sympathies contemporarily lay in the South, Benjamin
made clear: “We feel” the insults, but “do not feel the disposition to make any answer to this
taunt of superior power, or superior numbers. We but defend ourselves when invaded.”
Benjamin clearly believed that the unified national fabric was unraveling into two separate
regional tapestries.
For such a polished, articulate speaker, the oratorical shifts that openly discussed
collapsing national unity, and introduced the real possibility of war, point to the deeper currents
of Benjamin‟s largely inaccessible thoughts. For the first time he spoke of winning recognition
for the South not through political compromise, but through a war of independence. These
utterances were remarkable, for Benjamin had stood apart from the heated rhetoric of the fireeaters. Yet, he had also clearly stated: “if the time must come, when southern men shall be
driven into their last entrenchments before the superior power of a numerical majority that listens
to no reason, that admits of no discussion, that uses for its rule nothing but brute power…I
believe the South will, with one voice, say…[i]f you believe yourselves degraded by being
members of the same Government with us, let us part in peace.” These were certainly
astonishing sentiments and bore witness to the fact that Benjamin and his fellow southerners
believed wholeheartedly in the South‟s interpretation of the federal compact. Conversely, any
attempt to change to alter or redefine the South‟s asserted understanding constituted a clear
willingness on the part of southerners to destroy the national union to preserve their definition of
liberty and sovereignty.
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Benjamin closed his speech in an elegiac tone: “The South will one day – and I regret
that my short experience in this body has persuaded me that that day will soon come – be driven
to hold that position” of entrenchment. His loss of faith in the ability of the nation‟s political
institutions to heal the national divide was now almost total. Yet, Benjamin did not relish such
an outcome, and he continued to evince hope for a drastic political solution in the Calhounian
vein. Benjamin stated that he wished “to assist in averting that last, lamentable catastrophe to the
remotest possible time,” but that he was not aloof from reality, for “every day I am more and
more persuaded it is becoming inevitable.” He turned to the heavens and stated that barring the
unforeseen vigilance of Providence to avert the seemingly unavoidable: “good bye to this
glorious Union of States; good bye to all hopes of this successful attempt of mankind at selfgovernment.” The abatement of public virtue, made conspicuous by the absence of statesmen
like Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and John C. Calhoun, meant that “the last, the great, the
decisive experiment will have failed.”45 To prevent that catastrophic end, Benjamin bid farewell
to the party he had belonged to for his heretofore entire political career.
A little more than a year passed before Benjamin again addressed his colleagues, this
time on the affairs in Kansas.46 Widely considered one of the more illustrious addresses of his
career, Benjamin‟s previous biographers have all discussed the speech in widely varying detail,
owing to their examination of it as a stopping point in the historical progression to the Civil
War.47 The nuances of Benjamin‟s shifting rhetorical and political convictions are quite
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revealing when contrasted with previous statements on the compact of Union. Now, Benjamin
offered no apologies for slavery nor sought compromise, but instead demanded outright and
immediate recognition of the southern interpretation of the federal compact. His sentiments on
Kansas display a remarkable synthesis of his earlier views on the sanctity of constitutional
restrictions for the protection of minority rights and a progression of his thoughts on the
corruption of the federal compact. The Kansas speech also provides the most detailed insight
into Benjamin‟s deliberations on southern unity and nationhood. For the first time he discussed
his own ideology in regard to the protean allegiances of the national political parties, and took
aim at the young but already formidable Republican Party. Most importantly, however,
Benjamin offered the first public declaration of his own political conversion.
Benjamin opened his speech in a manner seemingly inspired by Calhoun‟s metaphorical
snapping cords of unity when he said, “thrice already has the bond which binds together the
different states of the Confederacy been menaced with disruption.”48 He offered a clear
repudiation of political compromise to which he had hitherto devoted himself and from now on
offered nothing but intransigence on the southern interpretation of the federal compact: “The
policy of seeking for some other comprises than those which are contained in the Constitution
was a mistaken policy on the part of the South….I thank heaven that the south has at length
become aware of this mistake.” Next, he outlined the South‟s new political position:”She has no
longer any compromises to offer or accept. She looks to those contained in the Constitution
itself. By them she will live; to them she will adhere.” Should the North believe the southern
interpretation of the federal compact untenable, Benjamin stated, “then she will calmly and
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resolutely withdraw.” He had issued a stark ultimatum with either acceptance or secession: there
would be no further deliberations.
Having suggested the withdrawal of the southern states, Benjamin proceeded to defend
the principle of secession by delivering a legal treatise on the Constitution and the southern
interpretation of the “spirit” behind its drafting. He offered a succinct definition of the South‟s
stance, and pursued his argument in a legal fashion that he hoped would transcend petty partisan
bickering. “I propose to place this question on higher grounds than any reference to the mere
text of the Constitution,” Benjamin opened, “I propose to seek for its true spirit; to inquire into
its true theory…and to see whether…it be possible that Congress can exercise the power to
exclude slaves from the Territories.” Benjamin‟s argument about the southern interpretation of
the “true theory” and “true spirit” of the Constitution intriguingly turned to the Declaration of
Independence.
To support the southern interpretation, Benjamin turned away from the Constitution and
instead pointed to the Declaration as central to the essence of American nationhood, for it both
the principles that defined American freedom. Benjamin began by rhetorically distancing
himself from the Union, proclaiming: “Sir, look at your Declaration of Independence. Upon
what grounds was it that its immortal author placed the right of the people of this country to
assert their independence?” If one were to view its grievances, Benjamin argued: “There is
scarcely one of them that is the usurpation of an unconstitutional power; every one of them is an
abuse of an admitted constitutional power. Upon that principle your government rests.” His case
stated that the Declaration embraced the true spirit of the Revolution, and that the South
appropriated that original spirit in its interpretation of the federal compact.
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If the usurpation of constitutional powers justified America‟s revolution, and the legal
foundation for its independence, Benjamin asked what overarching principle guided the
government that had been established as a result of those circumstances: “What, then,”
specifically, he inquired, “is the principle that underlies that whole compact for our common
government?” Benjamin answered by offering the most explicit definition of the southern
compact: “It is, sir, the equality of the free and independent States which that instrument links
together in a common bond of union – entire, absolute, complete, unqualified equality – equality
as sovereigns, equality in their rights, equality in their duties. This was the spirit that presided
over the formation of the Constitution.” He argued that American independence had been
legally justified based on the crown‟s and parliament‟s abuses of constitutionally proscribed
powers, and he argued that the articulation of freedom and the establishment of American
government had been a direct response to these abuses. The inspiration for American
government, he therefore asserted, originated from and embodied within its conception the very
notion of shared sovereignty. Benjamin claimed that the equal distribution of governmental
power was an essential component to the preservation of liberty, and perhaps the exemplification
of the founders‟ original intent.
Owing to his belief in its centrality, Benjamin cautioned against turning away from the
founding principle of shared sovereignty, warning: “Take away this league of love; convert it
into a bond of distrust, of suspicion, or of hate; and the entire fabric which is held together by
that cement will crumble to the earth.” The compact of Union, as he had defined it, owed its
origin to mutual trust and the notion of shared power. Benjamin articulated the particular
remonstrance of inequality felt by the South by saying: “I have heard no man yet contend that the
territory which has been acquired by treaty, purchased by the common treasure, or conquered by
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the common valor of the country, is not the common property of all.” According to Benjamin,
northern politicians‟ disregarded the explicit language of the Constitution that mandated the
essential equality of power, which he emphasized in his printed remarks: “‟provide for a common
defense, promote the general welfare‟ of the land.” But worse, he said, they had turned away
from the virtuous “spirit” of American democracy. To support his claim, Benjamin stated that
when southerners asked for their fair share to the land they were “insulted and mocked.” Despite
this derision, if southerners continued to press their claim out of the principle of equality, he
declared, “We are answered by „shrieks of freedom.‟” Benjamin hinted that such an overblown
display masked deeper motivations.
The underlying drive of northern politicians, Benjamin implied, lay not in any opposition
to slavery‟s expansion, but in a wish to see it entirely eradicated.

“The motive is a struggle for

power,” he claimed. The entire contest over Nebraska had nothing to do with the expansion of
slavery, acquisition of western lands, or the route of the transcontinental railroad, but rather,
according to Benjamin, the real issue was a regional contest “for political power.” He argued
that the crux of the struggle was over the domination of the Senate, which centered “the struggle
for power…here, on this floor.” He supported this claim by impugning the recent haughty
behavior of the senator from Massachusetts: “It was triumphantly avowed...He told us, with a
smiling conscious superiority which is so becoming him, that the North would take this matter
into its own hands.” Benjamin thus accused other northern politicians of disguising their
motives by using morality to conceal their real political and economic interests, which sought
unchecked authority and insurmountable political clout.
“The object,” Benjamin said, “is to attain such power as shall put” the North “in
possession of sufficient representation…to change the Federal Constitution, and to deprive the
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South of that representation which is already inadequate to protect her rights.” His comments
certainly belied a cynicism that doubted the ability of the South to politically forestall such an
outcome: “When that shall have been done [northern domination of the federal
government]…then will the Abolition sentiments which they hide now, but which they certain in
their heart of hearts, be developed to the country, and ruin and desolation spread over fifteen of
the States of this Union.” Seeking to reinforce his point, to register the implications of his
accusations, Benjamin charged once more that the North sought to dominate the South through
abolition, despite their “disguised, concealed” claims that protested otherwise.
That the South would react to such perceived threats by withdrawing from the Union was
clear to those who listened to Benjamin‟s grave warning. Although his cynicism over the
likelihood of political accord was considerable, Benjamin remained leery of secession. The
greatest unanswered question to this regard remained an articulation of the specific action that
would precipitate withdrawal of the southern states. To this question Benjamin devoted
considerable thought, but could only offer a frustratingly ambiguous warning about the
destructive consequences for both regions. Foremost, Benjamin stated that the South would
remain within the Union to pursue a prudent political recognition of the southern interpretation
of the compact. The centrality of a political solution was still of such importance that he said the
South would not be dissuaded or enticed by “direct attacks on their rights or their honor,” but
instead would continue to seek refuge in a persistent “appeal to the guarantees of the
Constitution.” Even at this seemingly dour moment Benjamin continued to express optimism in
the power of the Constitution to protect and vindicate southern interests.
After affirming the intent of the South to pursue its claims politically, Benjamin left no
doubt that a political failure to win recognition of the southern interpretation of the compact
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would result in secession: “When those guarantees shall fail, and not till then, will the injured,
outraged South throw her sword into the scale of her rights, and appeal to the God of battles to
do her justice.” It was heated language, certainly the most combative of his political tenure, and
he explained the reasons for such extravagant rhetoric by saying: “I say her sword, because I am
not one of those believe in the possibility of a peaceful disruption of the Union. It cannot come
until every possible means of conciliation have been exhausted.” Should compromise prove
beyond the reach of Congress after nearly eighty years of accord, he warned: “every angry
passion shall have been roused; it cannot come until brotherly feeling shall have been converted
into deadly hate; and then, sir, with feelings embittered by the consciousness of injustice, or
passions high wrought and inflamed, dreadful will be the internecine war that must ensure.”
Benjamin‟s warning to his colleagues underscored his lonely conviction in about the grave
consequence of political failure.
To this import he strongly condemned the “glib” rhetoric of northerners who claimed that
the South issued hollow threats. Benjamin harangued the nascent Republican Party for creating
a situation whereby “the people of the North are taught to laugh at the danger of dissolution.”
Benjamin repeatedly affirmed that the threat of secession was not a political stunt and his
comments pointed to his concern that northerners‟ disbelief in the seriousness of southern
secession undermined any political impetus to negotiate. Benjamin focused on Massachusetts
for the blame, and chided Senator Wilson for “indulg[ing] in the repetition of a figure of rhetoric
that seems peculiarly to please his ear and tickle his fancy.” Wilson deeply alarmed and
offended southerners by repeatedly speaking of “the southern mother as clasping her infant with
convulsive and closer embrace because the black avenger, with uplifted dagger, would be at the
door.” The South scoffed when Wilson issued patronizing threats, Benjamin declared, for in the
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same breathe that Wilson discussed the murder of southern women, he spoke of the federal
compact and warned: “that is a bond of Union which we dare not violate.” Benjamin argued that
Wilson‟s supercilious language denigrated the political process and exemplified the general
political taunts thrown at the South, the results of which merely fortified and encouraged
regional antagonisms.
Against this backdrop Benjamin declared that if political conciliation proved futile, the
act of secession would not be the result of ephemeral passions, but instead would be the
culmination of years of rancor. He warned that if forced to fight under such conditions, the
South would entirely throw itself into such a contest since it would “be compelled in self-defense
to wage a continual, unremitting war in which no sacrifice would be too costly, because we
should be bound to it by all the bonds of which gentlemen have spoken.” In regard to the
brotherly struggle, Benjamin spoke of the conflict as assuming a dimension beyond current
considerations, perhaps hoping that such a depiction might temper passions. He suggested that
the conflict over secession would escalate into one of total conquest or ruin, since once initiated:
“we never could abandon such a warfare because our very safety and existence would be at
stake.”
Benjamin‟s attempt to dissuade northerners from dismissing southern talk of secession
shifted from decrying the poisonous political rhetoric to condemning the increasingly negative
popular perceptions of the South. Benjamin delivered a lengthy refutation of Harriet Beecher
Stowe‟s recent publication and devoted considerable commentary to rebutting the wildly popular
claims in Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Affirming Benjamin‟s fears about the novel‟s ability to persuade
based on its sheer ubiquity, historian David Potter wrote that Uncle Tom’s Cabin was so
successful that “in 1852, for every four votes that Franklin Pierce received in the free states, one
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copy of Uncle Tom’s Cabin was sold.”49 Benjamin worried that the novel‟s success falsely
equated to its veracity in the popular mind. He worried that its fictional accounts of the sadistic
Simon Legree of Louisiana was seen as representative of the slaveholders in Louisiana.
Moreover, Benjamin worried that the novel encouraged and galvanized northern moral antipathy
toward the South and its peculiar institution. Benjamin spoke to this by stating: “the people of
the North, misled – kindly in their feelings – having their sympathies aroused in behalf of these
slaves, who are represented to them as victims of southern cruelty, have been almost led to hate
the people of the South for their supposed inhumanity.” Based on Benjamin‟s protest the novel
rooted perceptions of southern society more firmly in northern minds than any previous
abolitionist work, and despite its clear moments of dramatic exaggeration, such as Eliza
traversing the ice covered Ohio River, Benjamin complained that northerners proved unshakable
in their perceptions. He protested: “He has read in a novel the authentic fact that Mr. Legree
whipped Uncle Tom to death, and that is a thousand times more satisfactory than any such
foolish things as official documents.” Potter best summarized Benjamin‟s consternation by
observing: “Men who had remained unmoved by real fugitives wept for Tom under the lash and
cheered for Eliza with the bloodhounds on her track.”50 Despite all of Benjamin‟s and the
greater South‟s denunciations, Uncle Tom’s Cabin proved phenomenally persuasive.
Amidst such a public backdrop, Benjamin‟s parting comments focused once more on the
political atmosphere. He began by recounting the defeat of Winfield Scott, saying that he
remained faithful to the Whig Party even though it had been “beaten by a majority almost
unparalleled in our political annals.” Now, in this presidential campaign year of 1856, Benjamin
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explained that Kansas-Nebraska forced him to make a decision, since “like the explosion of a
mine, rent the Whig Party into fragment – fragments that no mortal skill can ever reunite, for the
cement of common principle is wanting.” He expressed personal alarm at the swift emergence of
the Native American Party in Louisiana, a result of former Louisiana Whigs seeking new party
identification but retaining their old hatreds against their former Democratic opponents.
Benjamin stated that the stampede of his former party‟s members into the “Know-Nothings”
occurred with such rapidity that by the time he returned home he “found four fifths of the Whigs
in its ranks.” Decrying its “vulgar” practices and fervent anti-Catholicism, Benjamin described
the Know-Nothings as a “new birth” of “New England prejudices against Catholicism and
against slavery.” He vehemently opposed the anti-Catholic platform of the Know-Nothings and
quipped: “I did not like the parent; I did not believe in the brood.” Mentioning nothing of his
Catholic wife or daughter, Benjamin made clear that he had to search elsewhere for a new
political home if he wished to remain in politics.
On the subject of choosing a new political party, Benjamin announced the issue as a clear
choice. “The struggle is narrowed down to a contest between the Democratic and Republican
parties,” he stated, denying entirely the viability of the Know-Nothings. Benjamin declared that
in appraising the contemporary political situation he would be “recreant” if he “allowed my
conduct to be influenced by the memory of past party ties, or past party prejudices.” He thus
swept aside the historical antipathies that had been exchanged between southern Whigs and
Democrats and claimed to be starting anew; having never been an ardent partisan, the process
was likely not very difficult. Unlike his fellow Whigs who scurried to the Know-Nothing banner
out of an unwillingness to let go of past political defeats, Benjamin dismissed past slights and
retained affection for personal political allegiances. His speeches had always revealed his
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personal attachment to the Whig party, based largely in his adulation for Henry Clay, and even to
some extent Daniel Webster. Regardless of Benjamin‟s decision to transfer his own political
loyalty by overlooking the Democratically inflicted scars of his political past, his personal
affection for the late Whig leaders remained an important component of his political convictions;
and they continued to serve as a prominent feature of his forthcoming speeches.
Benjamin thus announced that his time as an independent Whig had come to a close:
“The Democratic platform is identical with that of the old Whig party; and in declaring my
adhesion to the former, I but change name, not principle.” Refusing to abandon the political
principles of Clay Whiggery, Benjamin stated that he carried them with him into the Democratic
fold. With the simplest of utterances, he therefore announced: “I, sir, therefore, declare my
purpose to join the Democratic party.” Most likely alluding to conversion of former prominent
southern Whigs Alexander Stephens and Robert Toombs of Georgia, Benjamin stated that the
decision was not altogether an easy one, and that “it would be uncandid for me not to say, that I
feel encouragement from the fact that other, abler, and better men than I, have taken the same
view of their duty in this crisis.” Having issued his intention to stand with Democrats, Benjamin
quickly moved past personal matters and closed by discussing the regional threats to the South.
Losing all of the encumbrances of legal speech in an usual display of popular political
rhetoric, Benjamin closed his remarks by publicly championing the notion of achieving southern
unity under the Democratic party banner: “From all parts of the country, comes the cheering
intelligence, that gallant, and patriotic, and high minded leaders of the Old Whig party, ever
faithful to the conservative principles which they have professed, are rallying to the defense of
the Constitution from the attack of its fantastical assailants.” Turning from his new popular
cheerleading to his old prescience, Benjamin eyed his colleagues and promised: “Sir, the end is
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not yet; others will follow. The time will come, and come very soon, – sooner than they think.”
After appealing to the remaining independent southerners to recognize the challenge before
them, Benjamin, in a manifestly biblical allusion, proclaimed:
As the designs of the enemy become more and more developed, the patriot band will be
augmented with fresh recruits. Yes, sir; let the note of alarm be sounded through the
land; let the people only be informed; let them be told of the momentous crisis which is at
hand; and they will rise in their might, and placing their heel on the head of the serpent
that has glided into their Eden, they will crush it to the earth, once and forever.51
The compact of Union had been corrupted, he asserted, and the serpent of constitutional
usurpation lay threateningly coiled. Unless southerners acted in unison, abolition would strike
and the South would be lost forever.
Democrats embraced Benjamin‟s conversion and displayed confidence and admiration
for his rhetorical capabilities by sending him on the campaign trail, where he intriguingly
married support for James Buchanan with the old political principles of the Whig party. Back
home in 1856, the Louisiana Courier praised Benjamin‟s conversion, quoting from the
Washington Union, “‟This gentleman whose career in the Senate has already been so brilliant,
has just gathered fresh laurels,‟” to which it added: “He ought to have been a Democrat long
years ago.”52 Historian John Sacher writes that prominent Louisianan Democrats, “including
former gubernatorial candidate Alexander Declouet and president of the 1852 constitutional
convention Duncan F. Kenner” warmly welcomed Benjamin into the Democratic Party as well.53
The Democratic Party had been most certainly defined by the “passions” of its most
forceful prominent member, Andrew Jackson. The southern wing of the party, however, had
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been heavily influenced by John C. Calhoun‟s writings and beliefs. Benjamin publicly defended
his conversion by claiming to carry on the political legacy of the late Kentuckian, Clay, through
an adherence to his Old Whig principles.54 While his public justification for joining the
Democratic Party was straightforward, deciding between the competing political notions of
American constitutional democracy articulated by Jackson and Calhoun proved difficult.
Jackson viewed threats to the perpetual nature of the Union as treasonous, declaring the notion
that individual states possessed “the power to annul a law of the United States…incompatible
with the existence of the Union.”55 As a South Carolina Democrat, Calhoun expressed concern
about the South‟s inability to defend slavery as a political minority, which led to his distrust of
majorities. Based on his experience with nullification, a democratic plurality had not lead to the
preservation of minority rights, but instead had demonstrated the irresistible temptation on the
part of the majority to pursue its interests over the concerns of the minority. Historian Wallace
Hettle defines Calhoun‟s unique perspective on democratic government as “view[ing]
constitutionalism primarily as a means of protecting community prerogatives rather than
individual rights.”56 Reconciling these two divergent interpretations, the perpetuity of the Union
and community rights, required a clear choice on the part of Benjamin.
Over the course of his remaining Senate career, Benjamin fell firmly into the Calhounian
camp of the Democratic Party. He embraced the issue of minority rights, yet retained his
pension for moderation and independence, which stood him apart from the more extreme
secessionist wing of his new party. John Sacher wrote that during Benjamin‟s reelection in
Louisiana in 1859 he was aided by moderate Democrats and Know-Nothing legislators who
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“feared the victory of a states‟-rights candidate more than a triumph of Benjamin – a „true
Southern man‟ though „no fire-eater, alarmist, agitator, [or] sectionalist.‟”57 As Benjamin‟s
Kansas speech attests, however, he had embraced not only states‟s rights, but timidly condoned
the right of secession as early as 1856, although he always spoke of its an option of the truly last
resort. With his political conversion now complete, Benjamin fully embraced the tenets of
southern Democracy, and emerged as one of the most capable and forceful champions of states
rights‟s since John C. Calhoun.
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CHAPTER THREE
“YOU CAN NEVER CONVERT THE FREE SONS OF THE SOIL INTO VASSALS”
On a stormy August day in 1856 five thousand Democrats gathered at a presidential
campaign rally in Portland, Maine, to hear, among their local representatives, the southern
politicians Judah Benjamin and Thomas Cobb of Georgia. The event was well attended, and
included “[d]elegates from the surrounding area along with representatives from almost every
county of the state.” The southern men addressed the crowd of Northeasterners at Deering Hall,
“which was jammed to its capacity.” Despite the day‟s inclement weather, the turnout was so
great that “many were unable to get in at all.” Benjamin, Cobb and another speaker arrived in the
afternoon during the address of a New Hampshire politician. All three were greeted with loud
cheers, which interrupted the late morning speech. Benjamin had been selected to open the
event‟s afternoon addresses, and the local newspaper, the Eastern Argus, wrote that as he took
the stage, „before the speaker was a sea of upturned faces….The electric spirit of the occasion
was upon the whole crowd; and the speaker felt it too.‟58
A campaign speech was not unusual for Benjamin, but addressing a northern audience of
Democrats was certainly a novel event in his political career. Benjamin focused on the issue of
factionalism, and decried the abandonment of public virtue in American politics. He bemoaned
the loss American republicanism, which he clarified as virtuous, selfless governance intent on
preserving individual liberties. He mostly defined his brand of American republicanism by
contrasting the Democratic Party with those who, in his opinion, did not embody its values.
According to Benjamin, self interest in government led to a pernicious competition between
factions, which corrupted the essence of democratic government. Embodying this shift in
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American politics was not surprisingly for Benjamin the Republican Party. He attacked the
Republicans for their perceived adulteration of democratic principles, and claimed that the
Republican Party‟s insertion of self-proclaimed morality in governing subverted the political
process by stonewalling all possibilities for negotiation and compromise. Lastly, as if to recover
all that he believed lost, Benjamin issued a unique appeal to republican womanhood. He called
upon the women in the audience to assert their feminine influence over men to re-instill a sense
of public virtue, which would arrest the present course of events that threatened conflict. The
speech thus provides a glimpse into Benjamin‟s response to the fluidity of political events in the
latter half of the 1850s, and reveals his expanding concern about the interests of the South within
a Union increasingly hostile to slavery.
Benjamin‟s affability, permanently worn smile, and rotund, soft-featured physiognomy
made him an attractive and engaging speaker, and he no doubt used his natural gifts to appeal to
a sense of national party unity. Seeking to rally support for the Democratic Party‟s presidential
nominee, James Buchanan, Benjamin opened his address by mentioning his commonality with
the audience: “If the dwellers on the banks of the Saco and Penobscot can come to an
understanding with one who dwells upon the plains watered by the dark floods of the
Mississippi, then there is no reason to despair of spreading sentiments...” The Argus‟
correspondent recorded that his opening statement was well received, and that the audience
greeted the pronouncement of commonality with “prolonged cheers.”
Exhibiting his own independent nature, Benjamin told the crowd, the first he addressed as
a Democrat, that he would not deliver a typical stump speech that easily incited passions or
appealed to false flattery: “If any man expected to hear from me beautiful phrases, or appeals to
passion or party prejudice, he will find himself mistaken.” Turning to his concerns about the
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popular misperceptions of the South as a benighted, sadistic land beholden to the corrupting
machinations of a slave power, Benjamin pleaded with his northern audience: “obey the dictates
of reason and judgment, - suffer not yourselves to be led by old party predilections and party
prejudices to the wind, for the man that boldly breaks intellectual bonds, that breaks the shackles
that had been fastened upon his mind, is a being honorable to the earth from which he sprung,
and worthy of the heaven to which he aspires.” The audience responded to Benjamin‟s plea for a
considered, sober assessment of the political situation at hand with loud cheers, indicating an
expressed enthusiasm for his conservative southern sympathies.
Turning to the campaign for president, Benjamin first articulated his aversion to KnowNothings and declared them unworthy of discussion, although he could not outright disregard
their presence in the Northeast. Of the other two choices in the upcoming 1856 presidential
election, Benjamin expressed consternation at the legitimate prospects of the Republican Party
and its candidate, John C. Fremont. “He was nominated by a convention composed of delegates,
substantially, of but sixteen States of this Union,” Benjamin stated, before offering a brief
explanation of the South‟s political concerns: “Yes, ominous as the fact appears, for the first time
in American history, we have before us the appalling evidence that a party is now organized in
this country… which aims at governing the entire confederacy by a Union of sixteen of its
States!”
Continually stressing what he believed an unparalleled event in national politics,
Benjamin maligned the free soil Republican platform for corrupting the principles of American
government. He impugned its ideological underpinning by calling it: “A party which, for the
first time in your history, and in violation of the plain letter and spirit of your Constitution,
proposes to divide the States of this Union into two classes – one the superior, the governing
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class, the other the inferior, or governed class.” Attempting to impart the serious concerns and
the fearful mindset of the South to his northern audience, Benjamin asked: “Tell me, men of
Maine, you, whose fathers threw off the British yoke… if, in any contingency, you would ever
suffer the insolent assumption of other States to govern you?” A chorus of “„No, No,‟ and
cheers” answered Benjamin‟s inquiry.
Having clearly explained the reasons for the South‟s vitriolic dislike of the Republican
Party, Benjamin appealed to the national strength of the Democratic Party. He stressed that of
the current slate of presidential candidates only James Buchanan could claim the unqualified
support “of thirty-one United States.” He reiterated the preeminent criteria of his own political
conversion, a national party, yet still spoke fondly of the no longer extant Whigs. In a nostalgic
reappraisal of its leaders and principles, Benjamin invoked memories of Henry Clay and Daniel
Webster, and stated that if the Whig Party “existed at this hour as a national party, you would not
find me on this platform.” Light cheers greeted this statement, and Benjamin continued: “I
should be struggling in its ranks; and I tell you, fellow Whigs of the olden time, that they who
did that noble party to its death, were guilty of a „most foul and unnatural murder.‟” The crowd
responded with great cheers to Benjamin‟s favorable recounting of Whig Party, and to his
implied sentiment that the political principles which once united the North and South under the
Whig banner were now protected by the Democratic Party.
Having just conjured up sympathetic reminisces of the Whigs, Benjamin decried the
former Whig who now headed the Know-Nothing ticket. In an implied statement of disloyalty,
he impugned: “Millard Fillmore, gentleman, abandoned us.” This breach of loyalty, Benjamin
asserted, had been all the more egregious and dishonorable by the principles which Fillmore now
embraced. Benjamin expressed disdain for what he maligned as the conspicuous disregard of
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Constitutional rights that defined the Know-Nothings, for the party placed above all else, he
exclaimed, “an inquiry into the place where he was born!” He further ridiculed its religious
bigotry, proclaiming: “And then…to know if you wanted a man to serve you faithfully in any
office of trust or emolument, you must find out first by what priest he was baptized, and what
faith he professed!” Although much about Benjamin remains shrouded, his comments illustrate
the deeply personal nature of this issue. Foreign born, Jewish, married to a Catholic, and raising
his daughter Catholic as well, nationalist bigotry provoked an unusually strong, personal
response from the usually poised southerner. He concluded his rebuke by declaring the nativist
platform anathema to the Constitution, and made his personal revile clear by publicly affirming:
“I found those [nativist] principles professed by men who had murdered the party I loved, I never
could join them; I never would; I would die first.”
Having revealed an unusual enmity in his discussion of the Know-Nothings, Benjamin
next eviscerated the Republican Party for its regionalism and perceived radicalism. “As to your
Republican Party,” he stated, referring to its northern strength, “I do not count it; I am speaking
of national parties.” The reporter for the Argus recorded “Deafening cheers” at this
pronouncement. Benjamin continued, haranguing the Republican Party‟s provincial free soil
agenda: “I am speaking of men of a broad scope, whose affections cover the entire country; not
of men who see nothing south of the Potomac.” Renewed cheers met this latest statement, and
despite his earlier claim to avoid political epithets, Benjamin forwarded an unusually rash
rebuke: “I am speaking of men who look upon as hallowed, all the sacred memories of the
Revolution – not of men who spit upon the tomb of Washington.” This most extreme statement
proved a rare but telling breach in the demeanor of the normally composed senator. The twin
developments of the Know-Nothing and Republican Parties constituted a serious threat to the
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South in Benjamin‟s estimation, and his reaction demonstrated his deep-seated belief that both
represented sinister threats to American democracy, since he believed them both intent on
seeking power to limit freedoms through subjugation. Despite Benjamin‟s extreme hyperbole,
the correspondent for the Argus recorded audible rejoinders from the audience of „“Good, good”‟
and “cheers.”
Benjamin‟s criticisms of the parochial shortcomings and dangerous radicalism of the
Know-Nothing and Republican Parties thus discharged, he next extolled the virtues of the
Democratic Party. Again Benjamin offered his personal reasons for joining the party, and
justified his conversion by claiming that the Democratic Party of 1856 had incorporated many
Old Whig principles. Upon examining the issues of the two party‟s former opposition, he said:
“I found that protective tariffs, free trade, United States banks, distribution of the proceeds of the
public lands, and a thousand other issues of my early manhood, had all been settled by the
people.” Of the remaining issue of river and harbor improvements, which were vitally important
to him as a Louisianan and to the audience, he claimed that the Democratic Party had come to
embrace the position of “Clay and Webster Whigs.” Most importantly, moreover, on the “great
issue of the rights of the States in this confederacy,” Benjamin extravagantly asserted, “the Whig
platform of 1852, and the [1856] Democratic platform, almost identical in terms.” His tenuous
declaration read into the Whig past what Benjamin had wanted to see, a firm Old Whig stand on
the issue of states‟s rights. In this regard Benjamin sought to fortify his recent political stance by
assigning it an unchanging quality based on political principle. By conveying his lengthy
adherence to the principle of states‟s rights, Benjamin also sought to place himself firmly within
a conservative political context. Labels may have changed, Benjamin attempted to argue, but his
principles had not.
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In the most crucial passage of his speech, Benjamin, despite having appealed to the
common sentiments of northern and southern voters, addressed the one issue that divided
northern and southern society. He began by recounting that the Constitution had been drafted by
a “slaveholding confederacy” comprised of “twelve slave states and one free state.” Attempting
to overturn the notion of an aggressive South, Benjamin revisited how Virginia originally held
the land known as the Old Northwest Territory, but had agreed that it should be home to “to less
than three nor more than five” free states. To the addition of free states readily admitted into the
Union by the South, he also spoke the South‟s willingness to allow New York to create a free
state, Vermont, and to allow admittance of another, Maine. Benjamin mentioned nothing about
the Compromise of 1820, but regardless, he claimed: “So you have secured ten Senators from the
Northwest, two from Vermont, two from Maine, and forty-eighty Representatives, freely yielded
to you by this aggressive South.”
Loud cheers punctuated his statement, and Benjamin continued: “Aggressive! What have
you got for us to take?” The cheers turned to laughter and Benjamin continued to play to the
crowd. “Where are the slaves?” Benjamin asked sardonically. “Have you got any at the North?”
Listing the two region‟s similarities; lands, houses, banks, stocks, commerce, manufacturers, he
affirmed: “But we have got all these, too; so we cannot attack them.” Why then, Benjamin posed
to his audience, would the South attack the North for a species of property it did not possess?
This aspect of his address demonstrated Benjamin‟s longstanding concern with popular northern
perceptions of southerners, and his mocking discussion of southern militancy attempted to
expose what he considered the ill-rooted falsehood of a violent South.
Having opened by discussing all that the North and South had in common, he faced the
one economic aspect they did not share: “The only difference between us is, that we have a
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species of property that we did not create; we have slaves, that we did not reduce to slavery.”
Benjamin thus defended the South‟s peculiar institution, claiming that it had inherited, not
invented, the practice, and in later comments claimed that northern business interests profited
from its existence just as much as southern ones. As to the morality of slavery, Benjamin
defensively postulated that it resulted in the salvation of African slaves who had been born on a
continent of “idolatry and heathenism.” He thus explained why, in the eyes of southerners,
slavery did not represent a “disservice to man no sin, to God.” In fact, his argument attempted to
show why southerners felt quite the opposite.
Acknowledging the limits to this argument, Benjamin accepted the right to disagree over
the issue of slavery but wondered why disagreements over the issue had to threaten national
unity: “You believe differently. Well, why cannot there be a difference of opinion between us on
that point, as there has been upon a hundred others, without our tearing each other‟s heart‟s out!”
Since, according to his argument, the South had “yielded” to northern protestations that no nation
could be great without a robust manufacturing sector, and had therefore agreed to a protective
tariff that benefitted northern interests alone, why could the North not reciprocate over slavery?
To this matter Benjamin evoked the memory of Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, which was greeted
by applause, and he appealed for a return to the comity and compromising tenor which marked
the Congressional reign of these statesmen.
Finally, he offered a means of moving beyond the impasse over slavery. “I quarrel with
no man who looks upon it as a heinous outrage; I quarrel with no man who chooses to denounce
it as the most infernal outrage he ever of in his life, - but I will ask the man who so denounces it,
what that has got to do with the government of the United States?” Benjamin‟s solution removed
slavery from the debates over governing to protect both the southern institution and the nation,
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and he implied that the issue might best be resolved from the pulpit. Once the issue became the
centerpiece of a national political party platform, however, Benjamin warned that concessions
would prove unlikely, and the unity of the nation would be placed in peril.
Arriving at the end of the speech, Benjamin closed his first Democratic campaign rally
with a unique appeal to northern women. Urging them to restrain the proclivity of male culture
to resort to violence, he implored: “[I]f any of you have indeed husbands in the crowd of faces
upturned, use all the ministry of your gentle womanhood in making them remember the
sacrifices of the matrons of the Revolution.” Beseeching the nurturing sympathies of
motherhood, and reminding them of the burdens of conflict, he pleaded: “If you are mothers,
whisper that lesson to the lisping infant upon your knee, and lead him up to follow that example
which has made a saint of Mary, the mother of Washington.” Conflating matrimonial fidelity
with national unity, Benjamin turned to the young women of the audience and entreated:
“maidens, let the flush of indignation mount to your cheeks, and the hot scorn flash to your eyes,
if any man dare seek your favor while he cherishes sentiments of hostility to the prosperity of
your country‟s institutions…Tell them that the man who is false to his country is false to
woman.” To reinforce the potential calamity that awaited the nation mothers and wives should
war break out, Benjamin turned to seventeenth-century poetry and recited the final verse of
Richard Lovelace‟s “To Lucasta, Going to the Wars.” “You remember the verses of the heroic
poet of the time of Elizabeth,” Benjamin implored, “when his lady-love cast reproach upon him
for resolving to leave her for the wars, „I had not loved thee, dear, so much,
Had I not loved honor more.‟”
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With these lines in mind, he closed: “I pray you, all of you, use all the influence of your sex upon
these men. Use that benign household influence which is woman‟s chief glory and her crown.”
If women could restrain men‟s pursuit of honor, and assuage their excessive passions which
threatened the harmony of the nation, Benjamin promised that the reward would entail their
children enjoying the “blessings” of a country whose peace and harmony would “be perpetuated
forever.”59 His plea constituted a unique indictment of the excessiveness of a male culture that
placed a high value on honor and valor won through violence, and also evinced a pessimistic
belief about the ability of the nation‟s politicians and institutions to restrain this impulse and
resolve the divisive issue over slavery peaceably. To save national unity Benjamin tellingly
looked not to the executive branch, for which he was campaigning, or to Congress, where he
served, but to the family hearth where he hoped considerations of kin and community might
temper passions.
Nearly three months to the day after Benjamin‟s political rally in Maine, James Buchanan
won the presidential election. Buchanan claimed victory in all of the southern states except
Maryland, the only state Fillmore managed to carry into the Know-Nothing column. Benjamin
and his fellow Democrats had failed to bring Maine along in the Democratic victory. The
election results provided a clear picture of the political polarization of the country. Just as the
Democratic Party had nearly completed a clean sweep of the South, the nascent Republican Party
evinced serious strength in the North, where it won “every free state except California, Illinois,
Indiana, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.” In terms of the popular vote, Fremont captured just
over a third of the total votes cast. Most alarmingly for Democrats, Fillmore‟s and Fremont‟s
combined votes “totaled more than Buchanan‟s in California, New Jersey, and Illinois and
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almost equaled it in Pennsylvania and Indiana.” In summation, Michael Holt writes of the
political ramifications of 1856, “The basic lesson of the election for the Republicans was that
they would have to improve their fortunes in the lower North. If they had carried Pennsylvania
and either Illinois or Indiana, they could have won.”60
As Benjamin had made apparent in his campaign speech in Maine, such a prospect was
intolerable for southerners. He had unequivocally stated that the South perceived the Republican
Party‟s existence as an outright threat to southern society. He further stated that southern
politicians viewed the Republican Party‟s platform as an attempt to usurp Constitutional powers
to enact abolition, and ultimately subjugate the South. Benjamin‟s speech intimated that a
Republican victory in the executive branch would lead to a poisonous compact of Union, and
force the South to act according to its own best self-perceived interests. Although that prospect
had been averted in 1856, regional antagonisms continued to escalate national polarization
during Buchanan‟s first year in office.
The Supreme Court‟s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, which in addition to deciding
against Scott, declared Congress incapable of limiting slavery‟s expansion in the territories. The
sweep of the court‟s ruling outraged free soil voters, but delighted southerners. Republican
politicians like William Seward of New York encouraged northerners to see the verdict as the
result of collusion between the executive and judicial branches, evidenced by the whispers
between Chief Justice Robert B. Taney and President-elect James Buchanan at his inauguration.
In his analysis of politics throughout the 1850s, Holt wrote that the court‟s decision indeed had
“an important effect on northern opinion about the supposed southern slave power. Northern
critics increasingly lashed out at the Court and Buchanan, and the northern population began to
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see the Democratic Party as an extension of the southern slave power intent on “crush[ing]
republican liberties.”61 Just as the Republican Party had been constituted as a threat in southern
eyes, the legal implications of the Scott case were seen as a threat to northerners who feared the
court might next overrule the ability of states to prohibit slavery.
1857 proved a particularly tumultuous political year. In addition to the Scott decision,
Kansas continued to agitate national political affairs. To take control of the unwieldy territory,
Buchanan turned to a longtime Democratic politician, Robert J. Walker, a Pennsylvania born
southern slave owner and former Mississippi senator and Treasury secretary. Walker faced a
difficult task. Before his arrival in Kansas the proslavery Lecompton legislature had called for
delegates to write a state constitution. Walker vainly encouraged free-state Kansans in Topeka
to participate in the convention‟s voting, but his pleas were rebuffed. Concurrently, an election
for the territory‟s next legislature was held in which a majority of free-state men voted, this time
affirmatively responding to Walker‟s insistence. The free-state men carried a majority of the
seats, thanks in part to Walker‟s dismissal of fraudulent returns from proslavery polls. As a
result of the uncertainty of affairs, Kansas quickly devolved into an unrelenting competition
between free-state and proslavery advocates. The agitation reached its height when the
legislature, still dominated by proslavery men, called for a ratification of a proslavery draft of the
state constitution that included two provisions, both of which embraced slavery and differed only
in matter of degree.
Free-staters refused to participate in a vote orchestrated under such base circumstances,
with the result that the more extreme constitutional provision offering no regulation on the
numbers of slaves admitted into the state passed. Not content to allow such a vote to be
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perceived as expressing the will of the majority of Kansans, free-state men called for a new
referendum once the free-state majority legislature had been seated. The new referendum
resulted in over 10,000 votes being cast in protest of the constitution, which made clear the
proslavery constitution‟s unpopularity. Proslavery Kansans responded to the protest referendum
in kind, and refused to vote, which forced Walker to make a decision. He ultimately decided to
send the proslavery Lecompton Constitution to Buchanan, who accepted it in order to retain the
political patronage of the South. Buchanan encouraged Congress to adopt the proslavery
constitution and he used all the influence of his administration to push support for the adoption
of Kansas as a slave state. Buchanan‟s decision did endear him to the South, as he intended, but
Stephen Douglas and several northern Democrats were aghast that he had embraced such a
blatant corruption of popular sovereignty.62 The enmity over Lecompton split the Democrats,
and factionalized the party along regional lines.63
Responding to the events in Kansas, on March 11, 1858, Benjamin rose to address the
Senate in a speech that aggressively defended states‟s rights under the semblance of popular
sovereignty. He attacked those whom he believed only supported popular sovereignty when it
suited their political interests. Benjamin targeted Douglas, and throughout his speech he assailed
Douglas for having abandoned the Democratic Party‟s principal means of applying states‟s rights
to the territories. Benjamin demonstrated his considerable knowledge of international law, and
provided a sweeping defense of southern slavery based on an elucidation of the legal and
historical antecedents of English Common Law. His speech on Kansas also constituted
Benjamin‟s most legalistic address in the Senate, which sought to envelop southerner‟s
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constitutional right to carry their “property” across state lines within the ruling of the Supreme
Court‟s Scott decision.
Benjamin, always seeking to debate issues on redefined higher planes of his choosing,
immediately narrowed the affairs in Kansas down to the single issue of “whether it be competent
for the Congress of the United States, directly or indirectly, to exclude slavery from the
Territories of the Union[?]” This matter, he stated, had been settled by recent Scott v. Sanford
case: “The Supreme Court of the United States have given a negative answer to this
proposition.” Owing to their disdain for the decision, he denounced Republican senators who
derided Chief Justice Roger Taney or advanced the notion that the entire case was a
conspiratorial endeavor by the southern slave power to circumvent existing limitations on the
expansion of slavery. “This man [Chief Justice Taney] has been charged by the Senator from
New York [Mr. Seward] with a corrupt coalition with the Chief Magistrate of the Union,”
Benjamin began, before denouncing the assertions made by Seward, “He charges in fact – not
always in direct language, but partly by bold assertion and partly by insidious suggestions – that
the Supreme Magistrate of the land and the judges of our highest court, and the parties to the
Dred Scott case, got up a mock trial; that they were all in common collusion to cheat the
country.” At the end of his discussion, Benjamin issued a strong rebuke: “Shame, shame once
more upon the Senator....” All of these events, he implied, were encouraging each side to view
the other with increasing suspicion.
On the matter of the flawed Lecompton Constitution, Benjamin expressed contempt that
although free-state men in Kansas had been implored to vote, they decided not to do so. As a
result, he suggested that the free-staters had forfeited their right to protest the results of the
election, and that the ongoing refusal to accept the Lecompton Constitution was tantamount to a
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territory issuing demands to the federal government. Benjamin vigorously protested what he
viewed as an ultimatum coming from the free-state voters, men whom he believed had
dishonorable intentions: “Topeka! Topeka! That miserable rabble of insurgents; a miserable
raking together of men, the very scum of the large northern cities, seeking naught but violence
and bloodshed; presuming to set up their populace law, their will, against the Government of this
country; presuming to come and dictate to the Congress of the United States, „you shall do this or
we will fight; you shall give us this Topeka constitution, or there shall be bloodshed!‟”
Benjamin made clear his intention to stand firm and to support Lecompton, not necessarily for
the sanctity of the document but for the prestige of Congress: “Miserable, miserable, indeed,
would be our dereliction from duty; despicable, indeed, would fall the Congress of the United
States if it grounded arms and bowed in submission to the insurgent violence of these traitors.”
Kansas elicited language that showed Benjamin embracing increasingly hostile and resolutely
polarized perspectives, all of which stemmed from his opinion that the Republican Party
purposefully politicized territorial organization to win public sympathy and support for abolition.
Having accused Republicans of perpetuating chaos in the territories to buttress negative
perceptions of the South, Benjamin lambasted Douglas for breaking from the Democratic Party
over the issue that had been his hallmark contribution to the Kansas-Nebraska legislation. He
protested that Douglas‟s schism played into the political machinations of the Republicans: “The
object is to keep up the excitement for another canvass,” Benjamin accused, and offering
defiance, stated: “We say to these men, you shall not do it.” “Great heavens,” he mocked the
constitution‟s critics, “they are crying all around us, „what an outrage, what an outrage!‟” He
turned from satire to seriousness to advance the point that in his opinion the rage owed solely to
“admitting them into the Union! That is all, all.” Benjamin said nothing about the divisions over
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adding the first slave state since Texas, but nevertheless criticized his Illinois colleague in soft
language, stating that he did not understand how Douglas could claim that accepting Lecompton
was a mockery of his political legacy, “The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Douglas] would have us
believe that this is an abandonment of the principle of popular sovereignty. Mr. President,”
Benjamin asserted to the contrary, “it is its very essence, it is carrying out its true intent and
meaning.” He pushed the matter along southern political principles: “Let any man here tell me
what higher, what more exalted example can be afforded of the right of a people to govern its
own institutions, than that which is given by the people of a sovereign State of this Confederacy.
That is the right we now want to bestow upon Kansas.” Challenging Douglas over the
ownership of popular sovereignty for the South, Benjamin claimed that admitting Kansas into the
Union “is the legitimate fruit of the Kansas bill.” "For that act,” he stated, “I will vote.”64
After Lecompton passed the Senate in 1858, but failed to pass the House, Benjamin
focused his attention on legal rather than political matters. As was his custom, Benjamin
continued to argue legal cases which sometimes took him away from Washington, D.C. Just
before the election of 1860, he had been retained in an international legal case in California over
disputed mine rights. Before he left in August of that year, which removed him from the
political scene for the better part of five months during the peak campaign period, he protested
Stephen Douglas‟s actions over the past year which he believed responsible for dangerously
dividing the Democratic Party. In addition to Lecompton, Douglas had angered southern
Democrats with his equivocations in the Illinois senate debates with Abraham Lincoln, which
introduced even greater hostility between the “Great Debater” and his Democratic southern
colleagues. Owing to the growing level of distrust within the Democratic Party over Lecompton
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and the senate debates, Douglas had been unable to secure the unqualified support of southern
Democrats for the presidential contest in 1860. Douglas then definitively poisoned relations
between the regional wings of the Democratic Party by his public outburst directed at southern
Democrats whom had failed to support him during the Democratic convention in Charleston,
South Carolina, on April 23, 1860. A part of the convention‟s difficulty owed to the
inauspicious site of the convention in the very geographic heart of southern extremism. Indeed
“vindictive southerners” looking to “force their will on Douglas” attempted to push a political
platform that called for the federal protection of territorial slavery regardless of national
implications.65 When southerner‟s failed to win a territorial slave code that their presidential
candidate could support, they protested by abandoning the conference. Benjamin had supported
southern attempts to win territorial protection of slavery, but after the convention‟s breakup he
called for the southern delegates to report to the forthcoming convention in Baltimore for the
prospective albeit far-fetched hope of finding some sort of compromise. Before the Baltimore
convention took place, however, Benjamin addressed the Senate to respond to the angry
denunciations that Douglas had issued against the southern wing of the Democratic Party.66
After a lengthy recounting of the various, and in his opinion, contradictory, positions that
Douglas had taken, Benjamin let loose an avalanche of sarcastic ridicule on Douglas.
Benjamin‟s remarks proved cutting, so much so that they were later reprinted and distributed as a
political pamphlet for John C. Breckenridge‟s 1860 Southern Democratic presidential
campaign.67 “Sir,” Benjamin warmed up, “it has been with reluctance and sorrow that I have
been obliged to pluck down my idol from his place on high, and to refuse to him any more
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support or confidence as a member of the party.” Since Douglas had refused to support his
southern colleagues on the issue of slavery in the territories, Benjamin made clear that he
supported the jettisoning of Douglas as the party‟s presidential candidate. The reason for the
abandonment of Douglas, Benjamin explained, owed to his duplicity on the Supreme Court‟s
Scott decision. “We accuse him for this, to wit: that having bargained with us upon a point
which we were at issue, that it should be considered a judicial point; that he would abide the
decision…and consider it a doctrine of the party.” But, Benjamin stated, “having said that to us
here in the Senate, he went home, and under the stress of a local election, his knees gave way; his
whole person trembled.” In a begrudging compliment to Lincoln, he mentioned that Douglas‟s
adversary “stood upon principle and was beaten; and lo, he is the candidate of a mighty party for
the Presidency of the United States.” And of Douglas, whom Benjamin accused of duplicity:
“The Senator from Illinois faltered. He got the prize for which he faltered but lo, the prize of his
ambition slips from his grasp because of the faltering which he paid as the price for the ignoble
prize – ignoble under the circumstances under which he obtained it.” Douglas‟s refusal to abide
by the South‟s longstanding insistence on controlling the political issue of slavery had cost him
Benjamin‟s and the South‟s political loyalty.
Lastly, Benjamin derided Douglas for what he considered a petulant speech that lashed
out at southern Democrats for his own shortcomings at Charleston. Douglas had impugned
southern Democrats on the floor of the senate for encouraging passage of a party platform so
biased in its southern sympathies that it was unpalatable to all but the most ardent partisans. But
in denouncing the platform Douglas also implied that southern Democrats were conceited and
fanatical, and as he issued these accusations he attempted to mask his hostility as a defensive act
brought about by southern provocation. Benjamin would have none of Douglas‟s posturing: “I
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finish my speech as he finished his,” Benjamin said in a mocking tone, and quoted Douglas
verbatim: “„the Senate will bear me witness that I have not spoken on this subject until I have
been attacked; all I have said is in self-defense; I attack no man; and the world shall know that, if
I ever speak again, it shall be in self-defense.‟” Benjamin‟s biting caricature of Douglas evoked
laughter from his southern colleagues. Demonstrating the increasing vitriol of political rhetoric,
Benjamin departed from Douglas‟s tepid charges to boldly declare: “I belong to no school of
politicians that stand upon the defensive. If I am attacked, I strike back, and ever shall.”68 As
Benjamin‟s comments attest, the party‟s internal blows were severe, and they had the effect of
fatally undermining its attempt to win the presidency in 1860. Split internally, geographically,
and ideologically, a divided Democratic Party undermined any chance of challenging the
Republican Party for the presidency.
Owing to the divided Democratic vote, the Republican Party‟s victory elicited the
strongest defense of states‟s rights from Benjamin, who now also pledged support for the
principle of secession, but not its execution. His embrace of such a position was curious, for
Benjamin had exhibited certain independence in Louisiana‟s unique political environment.
Importantly, throughout the 1850s, unlike Jefferson Davis in Mississippi for instance, neither
Slidell nor Benjamin had to contend with a strong faction of Fire-eaters that tugged their political
positions to the extreme. The diffusion of extremist rhetoric owed, in part, to the diversity of the
state‟s population and their varying economic interests; it also afforded both men the ability to
articulate decidedly rationalist political stances.69 Historian William J. Cooper, Jr. writes of John
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Slidell, Louisiana‟s senior senator and chief politico, as “the quintessential political realist and
pragmatist.” Furthermore, as an expression of the Bayou State‟s political environment, Cooper
observes that the adopted Louisianan Slidell “had never been closely associated with southern
extremism, or for that matter, with any other ideological stance. Secession, he did not
advocate.”70 Neither did Benjamin, the state‟s other adopted son and senator, who shared
Slidell‟s decidedly rationalist, pragmatic political outlook.
But all that had changed with Lincoln‟s election in 1860. Although Slidell had also
previously been opposed to secession, as the man who ran the state‟s Democratic machinery he
positioned Louisiana to move in step with her fellow Deep South states, but waited for them to
act first. Writing to President James Buchanan on November 13, 1860, Slidell warned, “I see no
probability of preserving the Union, nor do I consider it desirable to do so if we could.” Once
secession became a reality, Slidell informed the president, “Louisiana will act with her sister
States of the South.”71 Slidell had broadcast Louisiana‟s support for southern independence
through political channels to preserve Louisiana‟s stature in the proposed union of Confederate
states, and to likely advertise his own availability and willingness to work toward that endeavor.
Although opposed to secession, Benjamin had always understood its logic. By 1860, he
could not fail to notice its transformation from a political abstraction to an outright assertion.
Even if Benjamin remained opposed to its application, instead preferring political compromise,
the logical progression of Benjamin‟s slow embrace seems clear. Absent from Louisiana during
Lincoln‟s election, having travelled to California to argue the case involving mining rights,
Benjamin delivered a speech in San Francisco on November 6, the day of Lincoln‟s election,
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over the sanctity of the Constitution . Speaking at the Tucker Academy of Music to benefit the
local Episcopal Church of the Advent, Benjamin‟s address was covered by the San Francisco
Herald and Mirror, which reported on November 7 that “[e]very available portion of the
Academy of Music was occupied; the aisles were crowded with temporary seats and large
numbers of gentlemen were standing.”72 Benjamin‟s speech broadly bemoaned the changes to
the Constitution which had occurred over the previous decades of the nation‟s growth and
expansion, and had resulted in the strengthening of Congress. He mixed criticisms, however,
with declarations that “[n]one will deny the cardinal principle, that the President when elected, is
the President, not of those alone who voted for him, but of the whole United States.” The
responsibilities of the office and the electorate, Benjamin argued, were twofold: the electorate
agrees to abide by the decision of the majority, and the president governs with the greatest
interest of the whole nation in mind. Benjamin further balanced his criticisms of the appreciable
changes to governing by making a strong declaration of support in the Union. He celebrated the
nation‟s continental expansion by metaphorically speaking of the strength of the nation‟s unified
democratic government as akin to the might of the Mississippi River:
Let it not be supposed that I view otherwise than with delight and patriotic pride the development
of our free institutions, their spread from territory to territory, from state to state; nor that I can
look with aught but kindling eye and glowing heart and quick-beating pulse upon the majestic
march of our union, which, like the great river upon whose banks I dwell, still pursues its
resistless course into the unknown ocean with lies beyond, swelling as it advances, receiving its
tributaries each distinct, yet each uniting in forming one common reservoir of wealth and power,
and each, I trust, to remain so united…
On this afternoon of Lincoln‟s victory, presumably without knowing the returns, Benjamin spoke
of his continued faith in the Constitution. “The Constitution itself, blazing with meridian
splendor, will assert itself,” he promised, and, “will, by its own light, establish itself as the great
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luminary by which the nation‟s path is to be guided; aye, will warm with its genial rays, and shed
its blessings on the heads of those even who revile and condemn it….” Demonstrating
confidence in the strength of the Constitution to right the wrongs in contemporary political
struggles, Benjamin offered his partial assessment of the Republican platform by stating that its
ideas were akin to the futile rituals of primitive civilizations. Only after present passions cooled,
did Benjamin promise that “the horrid sectional disputes, which now stun our ears with their
discordant din, be hushed forever.” Benjamin closed by stating that the responsibilities of the
American people involved living up to the example provided by the revolutionary generation,
which included preserving the “priceless heritage of our liberties and our union, the awful
responsibility of guarding both, as they have acquired both, by the pledge of life, of fortune, and
of sacred honor.”73 These were the last public comments Benjamin issued before slipping out of
San Francisco Bay through the Golden Gate on November 11. By the time he arrived back in
Louisiana, he discovered that his constituents and his colleague had decidedly pledged their
support for southern independence.
Benjamin‟s private deliberations during this period remain unknown, but once back on
southern soil his embrace of southern independence occurred quickly and easily. Although
historians are unclear about the exact date of Benjamin‟s conversion, the earliest definitive
declaration of his support for southern independence can be tied to a letter that Benjamin wrote
to his friend Samuel Barlow on December 9. In the letter Benjamin, despite his recent absence
from the South, ably understood the political mood of the southern polity and wrote that “the
wild torrent of passion which is carrying everything before it…is a revolution…and it can no
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more be checked by human effort…than a prairie fire by a gardener‟s watering pot.”74 His
constituents awaited a clear statement from Benjamin, and he did not make them wait long. The
New Orleans Delta reported that Benjamin remained opposed secession on December 11, except
as a last resort. On December 14, however, just three days after reporting his reluctance to
embrace secession, the paper now wrote that Benjamin had joined thirty other southern senators
and representatives who signed a letter advocating secession. The letter stated, “The argument is
exhausted. All hope of relief in the Union…is exhausted. We are satisfied the honor, safety, and
independence of the Southern people [require the organization of] a Southern Confederacy – a
result to be obtained only be separate State secession…”75 On December 23, as if to underscore
the tenor that had been adopted by Louisiana‟s politicians, the Delta printed a letter from
Benjamin dated from Washington D.C. on the 8 of December, predating the letter Benjamin
wrote to Barlow by one day, which argued that the time for southern independence had arrived.
Amongst this assemblage of private letters and newspaper reports, Benjamin‟s constituents read
in the Daily Picayune an announcement that Benjamin would deliver a public speech in the
Senate in regard to secession and the advisability of its immediate adoption.76 By the end of
December Benjamin‟s position appeared abundantly clear.
On New Year‟s Eve, in an address known as “The Right of Secession,” Benjamin
delivered an impassioned argument over the legality and inherent right of revolution in
democratic governments. According to Benjamin, the right of secession was a revolutionary
right, which must be acted upon immediately for the safety of the southern states. Benjamin
opened his speech by portraying the present calamity much as William Henry Seward had when
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he declared in Rochester, New York in 1858 that the quarrel over slavery was leading toan
“irrepressible conflict.” Benjamin stated: “We are brought at last, sir, directly forced, to meet
promptly an issue produced by an irresistible course of events whose inevitable results some of
us, at least, have foreseen for years.” Despite the prescient warnings offered by Benjamin and
others, he recounted: “sir, our assertions were derided; our predictions were scoffed at; all our
honest and patriotic efforts to save the Constitution and the Union sneered at and maligned, as
dictated, not by love of country, but by base ambition for place and power.”
He squarely placed the blame for the nation‟s current crisis at the feet of the Republican
Party, who, he claimed, issued “incessant attack…not simply on the interests, but on the feelings
and sensibilities of a high-spirited people by the most insulting language, and the most offensive
epithets.” These exchanges, Benjamin argued, had a “fatal success in persuading their followers
that these constant aggressions could be continued and kept up with no danger; that the South
was too weak and too conscious of weakness to dare resistance.” He indulged in a recapitulation
of the portion of his Kansas-Nebraska speech, which recounted the epithet of southern woman
clutching her child as the “black avenger” with a dagger awaited justice at the door. Benjamin
recounted the divisive emotions of the past, along with his repeated warnings about the growing
enmity in the South, and concluded by accusing Republicans of a purposeful delinquency.
“Alas, sir, the feelings and sentiments expressed since the commencement of this session, the
opposite side of this floor, almost force the belief that a civil war is their desire,” Benjamin
claimed, to which he promised, “the day is full near when American citizens are to meet each
other in hostile array; and when the hands of brothers will be reddened with the blood of
brothers..”
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His unconsidered warnings about the political temperament of the South had now led to
the situation whereby the most extreme secessionist state, South Carolina, had declared
independence. Forcing South Carolina back into the Union, or to allow her to leave in peace,
was the issue at hand. Yet, Benjamin sought to provide perspective, for although South Carolina
was the most extreme in its passions, he pointed out, “we are not permitted to ignore the fact that
our determination does not involve the State of South Carolina alone. Next week, Mississippi,
Alabama and Florida, will have declared themselves independent; the week after, Georgia; and a
little later, Louisiana; soon, very soon, to be followed by Texas and Arkansas.” After predicting
the sweep of deep southern states who would take themselves out of the Union, Benjamin
promised further defections. “I designedly exclude others, about whose action I feel equally
confident, although others may raise a cavil,” he said with an air of self confidence that bordered
on pedantry. His predictions proved accurate on both accounts.
Returning to the Declaration of Independence, Benjamin‟s preferred document to justify
southern independence, he revisited the original spirit that guided the founding of the nation.
“[T] he right of the people to self-government in its fullest and broadest extent has been a
cardinal principle of American liberty,” he began. Quoting from the Declaration, Benjamin
attempted to fuse the original American movement for independence with the latest southern
attempt: “And in that right, to use the language of the Declaration itself, is included the right
whenever a form of government becomes destructive of their interests or their safety, „to alter or
to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
happiness.‟” The inherent right of American democracy, as bequeathed by the inheritance of the
revolution, Benjamin argued, was the right of the people to abolish their association with a
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government when they believed their interests no longer served in continued union. He stated
unequivocally that that moment had arrived with the Republican victory.
Recounting the Daniel Webster and Robert Hayne debates, at the center of which lay a
dispute about the perpetual nature of the Union, Benjamin, in a nod to Webster‟s rhetorical skills
and intellectual acuity, recalled several arguments made by the late Whig. Webster had argued
that the Constitution was a compact between the states and that the federal government, through
the Supreme Court, held the ultimate position as chief arbiter in disputes between the states and
federal government; in short, the Union was perpetual: “liberty and Union, now and forever, one
and inseparable.” Calhoun‟s articulation, taken up by Hayne in the Senate, argued that the
Constitution remained a compact between the people and the federal government, and therefore
the people retained the ultimate right of arbitration in disputes with the federal government.
Although Benjamin shared a former political sympathy with the late Webster, he argued against
Webster‟s contention that the Union was perpetual. Overturning the perpetual nature of the
Union, Benjamin claimed, was justified by Webster‟s comments about the conditionality of the
federal compact. Benjamin stated that although it is undeniable that “there is a compact, and no
man pretends that the generation of to-day is not bound by the compacts of the fathers,” the
South was justified in its Calhounian assertion that the people retained a perpetual quality rather
than their representative government. Webster had made a statement that belied the
conditionality of the compact, and Benjamin condensed Webster‟s argument, stating: “a bargain
broken on one side is a bargain broken on all; and the compact is binding upon the generation of
to-day only if other parties to the compact have kept their faith.” The South, Benjamin argued,
believed the North remiss, which nullified all of its obligations and afforded each party the right
to disengage from a Union if they believed it poisonous to their interests.
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The importance of the conditional nature of the compact, Benjamin claimed, lay in the
fact that the current dispute between South Carolina and the federal government was not a legal
dispute, but a political one. “Now, Mr. President,” Benjamin said as he addressed the political
nature of disputes between the federal government and the states, “there is a difficulty in this
matter, which was not overlooked by the framers of the Constitution. One State may allege that
the compact bas been broken, and others may deny it: who is to judge?” On this disagreement,
Benjamin said that the Court had clear jurisdiction. He continued, “But, sir, suppose
infringements on the Constitution in political matters, which from their very nature cannot be
brought before the court?” This matter was of great importance, stated Benjamin, since no one
would deny that a state did not possess a right to recourse. If the court could not hear the
political case of a state against the federal government, Benjamin claimed, the ascribed course of
action for the offended state was found in the specific rhetoric of the Constitution. He recalled
the constitutional debates between Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Thomas Pinckney,
George Mason, and John Randolph, among others, and quoted them liberally but selectively to
support his view that out of the constitutional ratifying conventions: “we find that not alone in
these two conventions, but by the common action of the States, there was an important addition
made to the Constitution by which it was expressly provided that it should not be construed to be
a General Government over all the people, but that it was a Government of States, which
delegated powers to the General Government.” The answer to the perpetuity of the Union,
Benjamin stated, rested on one word alone.
Benjamin focused on the specific use of “delegated” and argued that its application in the
ninth and tenth amendments purposeful, intentional, and significant. The language of those two
amendments, he claimed, “is susceptible of no other construction:
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„The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.‟
„The powers not delegated to the United States.‟
Benjamin continued to push his point on the significance of the Constitution‟s language.
“Gentleman are fond of using the words „surrendered,‟ abandoned, given up. That is the
constant language of the other side.” But, he pointed out, “The language of the amendment
intended to fix the meaning of the Constitution says that these powers were not abandoned by the
State, not surrendered, not given up, but „delegated,‟ and therefore subject to resumption:
„The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, not prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.‟”
In the specific case of South Carolina, Benjamin argued, she resumed the powers she had once
delegated to the national government because of a political breach in the compact. Figuratively
speaking, Benjamin asked: “„South Carolina says, „You forced me to the expenditure of my
treasure, you forced me to the shedding of the blood of my people, by a majority vote, and with
my aid you acquired territory; now I have a constitutional right to go into that territory with my
property, and to be there secured by your laws against its loss.‟ You say, no, she has not.” What
tribunal could decide her assertion to that political right? “If none is provided,” Benjamin
claimed, “then natural law and the law of nations tell you that she and she along, from the very
necessity of the case, must be the judge of the infraction and of the mode and measure of
redress.” It was a statement of such firm belief in the rights of a minority that the ideological
debt to Calhoun was manifest.
As to the transgressions that were cleaving the nation in two, Benjamin stated that the
divisiveness owed to the Republican Party‟s obstinate opposition to slavery. That political
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position, although couched in the rhetoric of limiting slavery‟s expansion, was intended,
Benjamin claimed, to strangle the southern economy by depriving it of a future. “You, Senators
of the Republican party,” he said as he attempted to rally the southern audience, “assert…that
under a just and fair interpretation of the Federal Constitution, it is right that you deny that our
slaves, which directly and indirectly involve a value of more than four thousand million dollars,
are property at all, or entitled to protection in Territories owned by the common government.”
Ridiculing the accusation of Republicans that stated the South acted irrationally, Benjamin struck
back; “You do not propose to enter into our States, you say, and what do we complain of? You
do not pretend to enter into our States to kill or destroy our institutions by force.” “Oh no,” he
insinuated, and calling upon his knowledge of classical subjects, avowed: “You imitate the faith
of Rhadamistus: you propose simply to close us in an embrace that will suffocate us.” In
classical texts Rhadamistus represented the figure of a usurping tyrant, a perfidious man covered
in glory with an insatiable desire for power. As the nephew to the King of Armenia,
Rhadamistus waged war on his uncle, Mirthradates, and promised peace if his uncle surrendered.
Violating his word, Rhadamistus fell upon his uncle and cousins after they agreed to surrender,
killing them all and claiming the crown. Benjamin stated that the South would never fall prey to
such a scheme.
Speaking of the irreversible nature of the movement that now confronted them, Benjamin
admitted that his speech “is not placed before you with any idea that it will act upon any one of
you, or change your views, or alter your conduct. All hope of that is gone.” With an air of
finality, he stated, “The day of adjustment has passed.” Speaking to his southern colleagues he
promised that “within a few weeks we part to meet as Senators in one common council chamber
of the nation no more forever.” That the South would act in concert with South Carolina,

87

Benjamin had no doubt. He entreated his northern colleagues: “We desire, we beseech you, let
this parting be in peace.” Having previously affirmed the superiority of the North in terms of
population, industry, and war-making potential, Benjamin nevertheless explained that regardless
of such measures the South would wholeheartedly defend its territory. Still refusing to allow the
South to be impugned for aggressive conduct, he clung to the notion that although South
Carolina had acted first the North had initiated the contest: “If, however…you are resolved to
pervert the Government framed by the fathers for the protection of our rights into an instrument
for subjugating and enslaving us, then…we must meet the issue that you force upon us as best
becomes freemen defending all that is dear to man.”
Benjamin closed his speech with an appraisal of the conflict he now believed
unavoidable. “What may be the fate of this horrible contest,” he began, “none pretend to
foresee; but this much I will say: the fortunes of war may be adverse to our arms; you may carry
desolation into our peaceful land, and with torch and fire you may set our cities in flames; you
may even emulate the atrocities of those who, in the war of the Revolution, hounded on the
blood-thirsty savage to attack upon the defenseless frontier; you may, under the protection of
your advancing armies, giver shelter to the furious fanatics who desire, and profess to desire,
nothing more than to add all the horrors of a servile insurrection to the calamities of civil war.”
In a final stirring passage, he attempted to rally the South by proclaiming: “you may do all this –
and more, too, if more there be – but you never can subjugate us; you never can convert the free
sons of the soil into vassals, paying tribute to your power; and you never, never can degrade
them to the level of an inferior and servile race. Never! Never!”77 Despite the horrors that he
had portrayed, the attitude of the southern men and women who crowded the galleries rejoiced at
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this final statement of resoluteness. The galleries erupted into loud applause, and the commotion
was so prolonged that the Senate was forced to adjourn to restore decorum. As the galleries were
forcibly cleared, the spectators hissed.78
On the final day of 1860, after roughly eight years of a national senate career that
witnessed escalating political and regional hostilities, Benjamin advocated the dissolution of the
Union. His support for states‟s rights in 1854 had embraced Calhoun‟s views about state
sovereignty, and he too felt anxiety over the unequal balance of sectional power. As Benjamin
had surveyed the future, he worried that expanding regional economic and population disparities
would erode the South‟s political stature, thus imperiling not only the peculiar institution but
southern liberty. Now that the Republican Party occupied the highest office in government,
Benjamin viewed the compact of Union untenable.
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CONCLUSION
“IT IS THE CAUSE OF YOUR COUNTRY, YOUR LIBERTIES, YOUR INDEPENDENCE,
YOUR MOST PRECIOUS RIGHTS MENACED AND INVADED”
As the morning of February 22, 1861, dawned over New Orleans, Benjamin stood before
a crowd of twenty thousand New Orleanians and the Washington Artillery of New Orleans at the
Mechanics‟ and Agricultural Fair Grounds. The day had been welcomed at sunrise by an
artillery salute to commemorate the anniversary of George Washington‟s birthday, and
throughout the morning hours soldiers marched on parade through Jackson and Lafayette
Squares. The women of New Orleans had organized afternoon speeches to present the elite
hometown guards with a standard before they headed off to war. The battalion‟s color sergeant,
T.J. Wheat, accepted the ladies‟ hand-woven flag, at the center of which was placed a snarling
tiger that hereafter became synonymous with the Louisiana.
Benjamin stood upon the podium, having prepared a few words at the invitation of the
women‟s association. He delivered a graceful speech that touched on all the appropriate
emotions for the occasion, yet expressed sentiments far from perfunctory. He began by
addressing the gathering that had assembled to celebrate the southern spirit for independence,
which “quickens every pulse and fires every soul.” Turning to the soldiers who stood before him,
Benjamin assured them of the righteousness of the southern fight for independence, declaring: “It
is the cause of your country, your liberties, your independence, your most precious rights
menaced and invaded.”
Justifying the southern resort to arms, he pressed forward offensively, accusing the
Republicans and the federal government of menacing the South with their present posture:
“Already from the distant North are heard the first sullen mutterings of the coming storm – men
alien to you in feeling, and hostile to your interests, assert the insolent pretension of enforcing
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foreign laws upon your soil, and of reducing you to vassalage under their way.” Ever since the
Republican Party‟s formation Benjamin had specifically invoked “vassalage” to impart the
danger that the free soil platform posed to the South. He had cautioned that if the Republican
Party should ever gain control of the government, southerners faced ruin. Claiming that
southerners had been left no other option after Lincoln‟s election, than to preserve liberty by
seceding from a Union hostile to their interests, Benjamin maligned the Republican Party‟s
designs to restrict slavery: “With haughty assumption they claim the restricted right of governing
you as inferiors, and with an arrogance as insane as it is insulting, they affect to deride your stern
assertion of your rights as the petulant contumacy of disobedient dependents.”
Despite the revelry of the occasion, Benjamin remained convinced that a bloody conflict
awaited the soldiers before him. Declining jingoisms, he instead shared with the soldiers his
belief that the “fight for our independence is not to be maintained without the shedding of our
blood.” Not wishing to dampen the mood too much, however, he added: “I know that the
conviction is not shared by others. Heaven grant that I may prove mistaken.” Attempting to
close on an appropriately uplifting note, Benjamin used the dramatic imagery of nature‟s fiery
cycle of rebirth to offer an optimistic assessment of the southern future: “The fire sweeps over
the stubble, and the charred and blackened surface of the field attests its ravage. Yet a little
while and the spring rains descend, and the heated earth quickens into vigorous growth….”79 As
Benjamin‟s speech came to a close, he had conspicuously declined to mention George
Washington‟s Birthday, or, as he had in the past, to use the obvious symbolism of the occasion to
speak of the southern cause for independence in the same breath as American independence.
Perhaps this reticence owed to Benjamin‟s personal belief that the southern fight for
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independence would assume a more difficult, destructive course than many were promising.
Regardless, after Benjamin concluded his address he packed his things and left the stage, heading
for Montgomery, Alabama, to respond to a summons from Jefferson Davis, the newly elected
president of the Confederate States of America.
In the nine years of Benjamin‟s national political career he had risen from relative
anonymity as the junior senator from Louisiana to attorney general in the Confederate cabinet.
His appointment owed to widespread recognition that he had become one the South‟s great
spokesmen and intellectuals, having ably taken up the banner of states‟s rights with a rhetorical
skill matched by few and a legal mind respected by all. Benjamin certainly did not exist in any
man‟s shadow, be it the late South Carolinian whose views he dearly embraced or his fellow
senator and friend, John Slidell. His talents, along with his Jewish background, had always set
him apart. Yet, an important part of Benjamin‟s success owed to his status as an outsider. He
had not been born in the South, or assumed its customs absent-mindedly. Rather, after his failure
at Yale he made the conscious decision to live in New Orleans and pursue success the southern
way, as a lawyer and planter. Benjamin dedicated long hours to mastering Louisiana‟s legal
code and cultural customs, and his ambition paired with his intellectual acuity resulted in a
thoughtful but determined drive that eventually led him to politics, where he enjoyed the grand
stage.
As nine years of his speeches testify, states‟s rights were never more ably argued and
defended after Calhoun‟s death in 1850 than by Benjamin. His composed and judicious nature
explains Benjamin‟s success at gaining the respect of his peers. Importantly, his measured
rhetoric provides a lucid perspective of the South‟s changing attitude toward the North and the
federal government. As the newspapers and the Congressional Globe attest, Benjamin‟s
92

opinions were often widely considered and debated by political ally and foe alike. The
admiration that Benjamin earned from his contemporaries reflects the value his opinions were
accorded by his colleagues, and underscores the importance of looking to his rhetoric for
perspective on the political currents that influenced the South‟s opinion on the compact of
Union. In addition to his circumspection, Benjamin‟s perceptivity provides another important
but largely overlooked aspect to his speeches. His frequent mention of future events often
presaged his own reaction to events, yet also warned about the increasing vitriol felt by his
fellow southerners. Benjamin‟s foreshadowing certainly served his immediate political aims, but
his reticence also informed his predictions with an underlining gravity that was not solely the
result of political calculation. Upon evaluation, Benjamin‟s judgments reveal a great deal about
the political perspective of southern politicians, and his comments expose the gravity of
perception in the politics of the antebellum South.
Over the course of his Senate career, the shift in Benjamin‟s rhetoric is remarkable.
From incipient allusions of simple contests of aggression to later more graphic depictions of
biblical tales of annihilation, his speeches in and of themselves help to chart the changing
mindset of the South. Benjamin‟s initial sentiments in 1853, which he said in response to
Benjamin Wade of Ohio, acknowledged the “curse” of slavery. Nearly one year later, in 1854,
there would be no grudging ambiguity about slavery‟s influence on the South when he spoke of
the “serpent” of abolition that had “glided into [the southern] Eden” and needed to be crushed. 80
His repeated classical allusions also provide, in stark terms, a contrasting militancy in his
later speeches about the destructiveness of a northern and southern rift. In early 1856, Benjamin
adopted the language of Hector in the Trojan War to plead that the South “„not be drawn into
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such contests.‟”81 Yet, later that year, when speaking to southern critics, he closed by stating that
after Constitutional guarantees to southern liberty failed, and he seemed to express little doubt
that they would, the South would “throw her sword into the scale of her rights, and appeal to the
God of battles to do her justice.”82 By late 1856, Benjamin‟s speeches to southern critics
invoked internecine killing without hesitancy. Perhaps the best example of his increasingly
hostile language is the aforementioned regicidal story of Rhadamistus, which Benjamin used to
accuse Republicans of laying a snare “to close us in an embrace that will suffocate us.”83 On the
whole, toward the end his national senate career, battle, destruction, and death were increasingly
on the mind and lips of Benjamin.
Historian Michael Holt wrote that secession “was a rejection of the normal democratic
process.”84 For Benjamin, secession was certainly a revolutionary reaction. He uniquely
defended secession, however, as both the right of revolution asserted by the Declaration of
Independence, and as an implicit legal principle codified by the voluntary nature of the
Constitutional compact. As Benjamin had argued during his farewell address, sovereignty was
entrusted to the federal government by the people through their respective states. Therefore, his
logic suggested, the people could elect to resume direct control over their sovereignty through
state action. Benjamin believed that secession was legally warranted by the Republican Party‟s
indented usurpation the South‟s constitutional right to slavery. In an evocative sense then,
Benjamin viewed the Republican Party as an insatiable nineteenth century American expression
of the aforementioned Rhadamistus: deceptively attractive with its moderate claims yet cloaking
its true radicalism behind a false façade. For Benjamin, the Republican Party‟s platform
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poisoned the compact of Union by prejudicing one section over another. Any association in a
Union openly hostile to slave labor, Benjamin had come to argue, gravely imperiled southern
interests and merited a decisive response to protect southern sovereignty.
When writing about the nineteenth-century‟s most famous novel, James McPherson
observed that “it is not possible to measure precisely the political influence of Uncle Tom’s
Cabin.”85 McPherson‟s assessment certainly holds true for Benjamin, but the novel‟s moral
judgment on slavery in Louisiana, in particular, elicited an unusually impassioned response from
Louisiana‟s junior senator. Benjamin repeatedly decried Stowe‟s generalizations in his addresses
before the Senate; moreover, he expressed grave consternation that northern perceptions of the
South as a land of sadistic masters and moral degenerates became entrenched as a result of the
novel‟s wild success. Benjamin spoke of the personal umbrage he felt as a result of Stowe‟s
characterizations, and protested: “[northerners] have been almost led to hate the people of the
South for their supposed inhumanity.” Benjamin‟s real complaint was aimed at what was best
described by Lord Palmerston, Britain‟s future prime minister during the Civil War, when he
remarked that one had to admire “the statesmanship of [the novel].”86 For Benjamin, Uncle
Tom’s Cabin provoked a personal anger at being generalized as a man indifferent to humanity
and living in moral decrepitude by perpetuating the institution of slavery. What direct impact
these perceived slights had on Benjamin‟s political votes is impossible to determine, but that his
anger played a role in influencing his general demeanor is not. For proof of the radicalizing
effect beyond Benjamin, one needs only to look to the groundswell of shifting sentiments in
1850s Louisiana.
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The profound political shifts that Benjamin experienced were also reflected in the
attitudes of his constituents. Internal state party politics proved no direct threat to Benjamin‟s
career, with one exception: his political reelection upon his conversion from the Whigs to the
Democrats in 1859.87 Much of Benjamin‟s freedom owed to Slidell, who protected Benjamin in
a partnership that proved enduring and by all accounts equal, even brotherly.88 Slidell trusted
Benjamin, and Benjamin‟s long association and friendship with John‟s brother Tom cemented an
unusual political partnership between the two families. With Benjamin firmly supportive of
Slidell, Slidell was free to destroy the few political challengers who posed a threat to his control
of the state‟s Democratic Party. After the election of 1856, James Buchanan rewarded Slidell by
allowing him to effectively suggest candidates for federal patronage that would receive
appointments. Never in the late antebellum era was the Democratic Party of Louisiana more
firmly in the control of one man, and both Slidell and Benjamin both enjoyed an unusual degree
of political latitude between 1856-1860.
Owing to the perceived threat of a Lincoln election, Louisiana discarded its accustomed
political moderation beginning in late 1860, and certainly by early 1861, and embraced firebrand
calls for disunion. The marked shift in the political environment in New Orleans, long noted for
its political conservatism owing to its dependency on mercantile trade, was reported in local
newspapers. On December 22 the New Orleans Bee, writing two days after South Carolina‟s
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secession, called the Crescent City a “hotbed of secession.”89 Benjamin‟s discussion of a
gardener‟s pot being incapable of extinguishing a prairie fire revealed his own observation about
the rapidity with which secession gained broad support in Louisiana. As Benjamin had intimated
during his Kansas address, and again during the political rally for Buchanan in Maine, southern
views of liberty and sovereignty were inexplicably linked to slavery. Upon that single peculiar
institution, Benjamin declared, rested not only the southern economy, but the very social
structure that defined freedom and liberty. Any attempt to alter that deeply embedded institution,
he had warned, would provoke the sternest of responses. With the election of Abraham Lincoln,
Louisianans swept aside all moderation and responded to the perceived abolitionist threat of
Republicanism by embracing the extreme measure of secession.
Historian David Potter‟s prudent counsel that “hindsight is the historian‟s chief asset and
main liability” is quite appreciable when examining Benjamin‟s political career leading up to the
secession crisis.90 With Potter‟s caution in mind, it is not too ambitious to assert that Benjamin‟s
rhetoric beginning in1856 forewarned of danger of a political incapability to compromise over
slavery. As Benjamin became increasingly convinced that political factionalizing and regional
polarization rendered any compromise impossible, he tailored his speeches to warn his
colleagues and constituents of the eventuality of conflict. Despite Benjamin‟s pessimistic
assessment of the future, however, as the presidential election of 1860 approached, he remained
publicly opposed to secession. Yet, following Benjamin‟s return from California in early
December after Lincoln‟s election, his assessment of Louisiana‟s and the South‟s popular
attitudes led him to invoke rhetoric that not only embraced secession, but advocated its adoption
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forthwith. Benjamin responded to his assessment about the popular support for secession by
praising the southern movement for independence and encouraging his southern colleagues to
join the Deep South in the preservation of liberty. The New Year‟s Eve plea provided a fitting
bookend to Benjamin‟s Senate career. Having prepared his constituents as early 1856 for the
likelihood of conflict, with Abraham Lincoln‟s election in 1860 Benjamin found himself
wrapped up in the Deep South‟s embrace of secession‟s logic and necessity.
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